ESSAYS

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SCRIPTURE METAPHORS,

DIVINE JUSTICE,

DIVINE MERCY,

AND THE

DOCTRINE OF SATISFACTION.

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ESSAYS.

ESSAY I.

On the Scripture Metaphors.

WHEN the ſcriptures teach us the things of God and of another world, they uſe and muſt uſe Metaphors. A literal account, in many caſes * cannot be given. Men in their preſent ſtate have not, and cannot have the ideas peculiar to another ſtate; no words can convey ſuch ideas. When St. Paul was caught up into Paradiſe, he heard unſpeakable words, ſuch as were *impoſſible* to be uttered. He received new

* We ſay, in many caſes; for in ſome a literal account could be given. Thus were we told the particular time of the day of judgement, we could underſtand it. But the caſes are but few.

ideas, which it was not poſſible for him, by any words to communicate to others. When the ſcriptures, then, teach us the things of another world, it muſt be by reſemblances taken from the things of this world. By Metaphors, by Enigmatical Deſcriptions; ſo that we ſee now only through a glaſs darkly, and as it were in an *Enigma*; and it muſt ever be remembered, that while this is the caſe, we ſee *in part* only.

Metaphors at beſt are only reſemblances; and we muſt not expect to find the reſemblance hold in every circumſtance. The purpoſe of the metaphor is fully anſwered, if the reſemblance holds in ſome one capital point; in that point which is intended to be taught. The very ſame capital doctrine may alſo be illuſtrated and explained by different metaphors, according to the different light in which it is placed; or, as different parts of that doctrine are intended to be conveyed to us.

It will be aſked, how ſhall we know in what parts of a metaphor the reſemblance holds? Will not doctrines thus conveyed be vague, and of doubtful interpretation?—Not at all; all language abounds with metaphors; we can ſcarce ſpeak without uſing a variety of alluſions, yet no uncertainty follows from it. The boldeſt figures of ſpeech ſeldom render our meaning uncertain, yet add a great force to what is delivered.

Much

Much leſs ſhall we be at a loſs to know what is literal and what is metaphorical. Let us try in an inſtance or two.

It is ſaid of the damned in hell, that *their worm dieth not*, and that the *fire of hell ſhall never be quenched.* Every one ſees that the expreſſion *their worm dieth not*, cannot be underſtood literally of a worm creeping on the earth, but is a metaphor. The inceſſant upbraidings of a guilty conſcience are very aptly, as well as forcibly, repreſented by the gnawings of a worm, which does not quickly devour the ſubſtance on which it feeds, but preys on it continually. When it is ſaid this worm dieth not, every one will underſtand by it, that the guilt of the damned ever remains unatoned for, and the upbraidings never ceaſe. Again, if we take the fire of hell in a metaphorical ſenſe, it is plainly put to ſignify the greateſt poſſible torment. *Burning alive* is with men accounted the greateſt torture poſſible. Whether we have preciſe ideas of the torments of hell, or not, the words are awful enough, and their meaning paſt a doubt. But if any ſhould ſay, the words may be underſtood as well in a literal as a metaphorical ſenſe, inaſmuch as the body will be raiſed, let it be ſo; no error will follow. We ſhall never be in danger of miſtake when the words are ſuch as can be underſtood either literally or metaphorically. When they can be un-

derſtood only metaphorically, we ſhall always ſee the principal point intended to be conveyed by the metaphor. It is further ſaid, *the fire will never be quenched:* This is purſuing the former metaphor, and is taken from putting out fire by throwing water upon it. The literal meaning is too obvious to admit a doubt. That the torment will never have an end; it ſhall endure for ever.

Again. Our Saviour ſays, "Except a man "be born again, he cannot ſee the kingdom of "heaven."—But who is there ſince the days of Nicodemus that takes theſe words in their literal ſenſe? Now the nature of every animal is determined by the breed or race from which it ſprings. That which comes of a ſavage breed is of a ſavage, fierce nature; that which is of a timid race of animals, is of a timid, harmleſs nature. To be born again, then, means to be made of a new and different nature, different from what we are by our natural birth and deſcent. That which is born of the fleſh is fleſh; that which is of the breed and race of fallen man, has, by birth and nature, the carnal and corrupt affections that belong to all the race of fallen man. That which is born of the Spirit is Spirit. That which is made of a new nature by the operation of the Holy Spirit, is made of an holy and ſpiritual nature; of the nature of that power which produces the change.

In

In other parts of ſcripture it is ſaid, that if any man be in Chriſt he is a new creature; that is, as it were, created over again. True Chriſtians are ſaid to have put off the old man, which is corrupt, and to have put on the new man, which is *renewed*, after the image of the Creator. Theſe paſſages ſhew us what is meant by the *new birth*; a metaphor very ſignificant and forcible. By the new birth is meant that great change in the will and affections which is wrought in Chriſtians by the power of the Holy Spirit*. A change as much above our power to effect, as it is above our power to make our own nature, or to change the nature of any breed of animals; and as much above our capacity to comprehend, as how each animal derives its particular nature from that race of which it ſprings.

To purſue the metaphor any further, is plainly beſides the purpoſe for which it was brought. Thus the time of labour in the natural childbirth is not long—but we cannot from hence infer any thing about the time taken up in the

* The Spirit maketh interceſſion for us by interceding *in* us; that is, by exciting in the minds of true Chriſtians unfeigned deſires after God, and every holy temper implied in the fervent prayer of a righteous man.

Hey on the Atonement, page 85. See alſo Powell's Sermons, p. 212, S. xiii.

new birth, or the time before that change we call regeneration is fully accompliſhed. If we go further, and fancy any thing analogous to the time of travel, or time of geſtation, previous to the natural birth, or to the pains and efforts of a woman in labour, we ſhall become more abſurd. It is plain nothing of this is intended or can be warranted by the uſe of the metaphor. Therefore, when profane men, to ridicule regeneration, talk of feeling the pangs of the new birth, &c. it is a ſtrained application of the metaphor; very impertinent and very unfair.

The parable of the Prodigal Son is one of the moſt ſtriking reſemblances in ſcripture. The plain purport of it is to repreſent God's diſpenſation both to the Jews and Gentiles, with their temper and diſpoſition. Both are repreſented as originally of the ſame family; the former continuing in the Father's houſe, under his care and government, the latter leaving God's houſe, forſaking God's worſhip and laws, following his own vicious inclinations, falling into extreme ignorance *(ſpiritual want)* and wretchedneſs. Yet the common father of both receives the returning Gentiles with readineſs and joy; notwithſtanding the ſelfiſh Jew grudges the mercy thus ſhown to them.

The

The intent of the parable is plainly to open that myſtery which, from the beginning of the world, had been hid in God, that the returning Gentiles, notwithſtanding their defection, ſhould be fellow-heirs with the Jews; of the ſame body, and partakers of God's promiſe in Chriſt by the goſpel. Not to *repreſent the manner in which God forgives the ſins of his offspring of mankind**; or to explain upon what grounds, mercy ſhould be extended both to Jew and Gentile; namely, that Chriſt ſhould reconcile both unto God in one body by the croſs, having ſlain the enmity thereby. No wonder mention is not made of the means of this reconciliation, as the parable was not meant to open or illuſtrate this point: nor can ſilence in this place be oppoſed to repeated declarations in other parts of ſcripture.

Another ſcripture metaphor is that of *debts*. Sometimes put for duties *owing* to God; ſometimes for ſins to be accounted for, ſometimes for puniſhment, or what is *due* to the juſtice of God. Remiſſion of the puniſhment *due* to ſin, that is (to make ſenſe of it) due to the *ſinner*, is called metaphorically *remitting* his *debt*. And this metaphor is uſed in ſcripture, with great propriety, to inculcate the doctrine of mutual forgiveneſs among men. But if from this uſe of the word

* Prieſtley's Appeal, p. 19.

debts we infer that puniſhment, like debts of property, may be *transferred* from the identical perſon who commits the ſin to any other, we then draw a conſequence never intended nor warranted by the uſe of the metaphor, either in the Lord's prayer, the parable of the wicked ſervant, Mat. xviii. or any other part of ſcripture. This metaphor is no where uſed by the Apoſtles to illuſtrate the great myſtery of redemption; nor will it, as ſome ſuppoſe, explain the *manner* in which divine juſtice was ſatisfied by the ſufferings of Chriſt; or in *what way* his death hath its efficacy; that is, to ſpeak in ſcripture language, *how* it is that his blood, and his alone, cleanſeth us from all ſin. An eagerneſs for ſolving EVANGELICAL PARADOXES, as they are called, has done much diſſervice to the cauſe of Chriſt, from the days of the *Gnoſtics* down to the *ſchool-men* of our own times.

Ranſomed, or *redeemed*, is one of the metaphors uſed by our Lord, Mat. xx. 28, and very much by the Apoſtles, when they would illuſtrate the method of ſalvation by Chriſt. The Devil is repreſented in ſcripture as the prince and god of this world, at enmity with the God of heaven, and waging perpetual war againſt him. Man was deſigned originally to be the *ſubject* of God who created him; but through the corruption of his nature by the fall, he is become a *captive* to

ſin

ſin and Satan;—faſt *bound* in miſery—ſitting in darkneſs and the ſhadow of death. By the ſufferings and death of Chriſt, man is delivered from this captivity. Now, among men, priſoners are *ranſomed*, and captives are *redeemed* from the bondage of *that* power which *detains* them;—they are reſtored to their former liberty under the prince whoſe natural ſubjects they are.—They are redeemed or ranſomed with a ſum of money which is always paid to that power which takes the priſoner captive, and detains him in bonds, being the price of his liberty; and it is abſurd to ſuppoſe this price paid to his own prince, who neither detains him priſoner, nor wiſhes him to be detained, but receives him as his own. In alluſion to this practice among men, Chriſtians are ſaid to be redeemed from the *power* of Satan to God. They are redeemed to God by the blood of Chriſt; are delivered from the *power* of darkneſs; are delivered from the *bondage* of corruption, to the glorious *liberty* of the ſons of God. But Chriſtians are not redeemed with corruptible things as *ſilver* and *gold*, but with the precious blood of Chriſt, who gave himſelf a *ranſom* for all.—Here the metaphor ends; the whole purport of it being to repreſent to us—our ſtate by nature—our deliverance by Chriſt,—our return to God. By this lively and familiar metaphor, the Apoſtles ſet forth the mercy of God, the love of Chriſt to man,

man, the obligations and duty of the redeemed of the Lord.

A celebrated dialogue writer * introduces one of the ſpeakers as objecting to the doctrine of redemption; that if the blood of Chriſt was the ranſom, Chriſt muſt pay this ranſom (his life) to Satan, who led ſinners captive. The anſwer given is—"The ranſom was paid to God, be-"cauſe the confeſſion of the ſaints in light is—"Thou haſt redeemed us to God." The objection to be ſure is fooliſh, and yet the anſwer is unſatisfactory. The ſaints are indeed the perſons redeemed; they are alſo redeemed to him who originally created them in his own image—in other words, they become *his* again. But this is no anſwer to the enquiry (not who was the receiver of the perſons redeemed on their return from captivity, but) who, *according to the tenor of the metaphor*, ought to be the receiver of the price paid for their ranſom? And if you will purſue the metaphor throughout, you cannot evade the difficulty. But the doctrines of chriſtianity are not grounded on metaphors, but metaphors are introduced to illuſtrate the doctrines. And in ſuch illuſtrations there is no neceſſity the reſemblance ſhould hold throughout in every circumſtance, nor is the metaphor applicable here.

* Theron and Aſpaſio, Dial. iii. p. 70, London edit. p. 57, Edinburgh edit.

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The purpoſe for which this metaphor is introduced is not to teach us the myſterious proceedings of God in the vindication of his juſtice; but to teach man his obligations and duty to Chriſt; and this end it anſwers without a reſemblance in every point *.

When the Apoſtles change the metaphor, and inſtead of captives taken by force and detained againſt their will, repreſent mankind as rebels againſt their lawful ſovereign, as voluntary deſerters to the enemy, then *reconciliation*, not *redemption*, is the term made uſe of. The blood of Chriſt is not now the *price* of redemption, but the propitiation, the *atonement* made for their rebellion; and thus we are *reconciled* to God by the death of his ſon, by whom we have received the *atonement*. You that were ſometimes alienated and *enemies* in your minds by wicked works, yet now hath he *reconciled* in the body of his fleſh through death. The humiliation, ſufferings, and death of Chriſt, both God and man, are ſo extraordinary in themſelves, and of ſuch importance, that it is no wonder their effects, as

* Expoſitors of ſcripture ſhould be very cautious of deducing any other doctrine from a parabolic (or a metaphorical) repreſentation, but what appears to be deſignedly enforced by that repreſentation. Without this caution the moſt abſurd opinions may be, and indeed too often have been urged from theſe parts of holy writ.

Hey on the Atonement, page 35.

far

far as concerns mankind, ſhould be ſet forth in a variety of ſtriking images. As far as they have relation to the divine attributes or parts of God's univerſal government, unknown to us; no wonder the ſcripture ſhould be ſilent. Perhaps we totally want the ideas neceſſary to underſtand even a very little of thoſe things which the angels deſire to look into.

Beſides this way by metaphors, there is alſo another way by which the ſcriptures do in part convey to us the knowledge of the things of another world, that is by negatives; not telling us *what they are*, but *what they are* not. Thus it is ſaid the dead ſhall be raiſed incorruptible; that is, not as now, liable to diſſolution: That this mortal muſt put on immortality—That we ſhall be changed, we are indeed told; but what is the nature of this change, or in what manner our mortal bodies ſhall be thus rendered immortal and incorruptible, we are not told.

What has been ſaid may furniſh us with an anſwer to thoſe who contend there can be no myſteries in religion*. Either we underſtand theſe propoſitions, ſay they, or we do not. If we do underſtand them, they are no longer myſteries; if we do not, they convey no knowledge. They are to us without meaning; and

* Where myſtery begins religion ends.

he

he that ſpeaketh them ſhall be unto us a barbarian; he ſpeaketh in an unknown tongue.—But the enumeration is not perfect; we may neither underſtand the ſubject completely, nor be wholly ignorant: we may underſtand in part: and we have ſeen two ways at leaſt in which knowledge may be communicated in part; either by the uſe of metaphors or by negatives. But beſides this, all general ideas (being formed by abſtraction from particular ones which alone are perfect) are of neceſſity incomplete; yet we make no objections to ſuch in common life. We underſtand what is meant by a ſtate of happineſs or miſery, though we may have no idea in what that happineſs or miſery conſiſts; nor have particular ideas of that ſtate at all. When we believe, we believe only ſo much as we do underſtand, we can believe no more; but we may often perceive that what we underſtand is intimately connected with much more that we do *not* underſtand. Thus we believe that God created the world. That is, we believe the world did not make itſelf; that there was a time before the world, or matter of any ſort exiſted; and we alſo know the world does now exiſt. Thus much we underſtand; but how or in what way the world was made out of nothing, we do not underſtand. Thus, then, the preſent exiſtence of the world which we do underſtand, is intimately connected with the act

of

of creation, which we do not underſtand*. And ſo much of this matter relating to the origin of this world, as we can thus underſtand, is all that is of importance for us to know at preſent. And very important is that pittance of knowledge of the things of another world, which is thus conveyed to us by metaphors and negatives in the holy ſcriptures.

* We read that God *ſaid* Let there be light, and there was light. That he *ſpake*, and it was done. He commanded, and it ſtood faſt. This is plainly a *metaphorical* repreſentation; but it is ſuch a one as conveys the moſt ſublime idea of the divine omnipotence. The works of men are effected with much labour and pain; they require time to be completed.—Not ſo (the metaphor teaches us) the works of God. Therefore the juſt concluſion is, "Let "all the earth fear the Lord, let all the inhabitants of the "earth ſtand in awe of him."

ESSAY II.

On Juſtice, as an Attribute of God.

BEFORE we enter upon the enquiry on what grounds we admit the divine juſtice, it will be proper to conſider what we mean by juſtice when thus attributed to the Deity; both as diſtinguiſhed from holineſs, another attribute of the Deity with which that of juſtice is often confounded; alſo as diſtinguiſhed from what we call juſtice in the ordinary dealings between man and man.

Now if we conſult the feelings implanted in us by our maker, we ſhall find that all men have a conſciouſneſs of right and wrong. They approve of certain actions, or rather a principle of acting, calling it *right*; they diſapprove of the contrary courſe, calling it *wrong*. And it may be obſerved, that theſe natural ideas of right and wrong are totally different from the idea of *utility* or profit, (and its contrary) whether to ourſelves or others*. This approbation of ac-

* Butler's ſecond diſſertation. Alſo Ogden's Sermons. Alſo Clarke on Natural Religion.

tions

tions, or of the principle producing them, is alſo attended with an eſteem or reverence for the agent; the contrary with diſeſteem or deteſtation.

But ſimple diſapprobation is not the whole of that judgment which men thus paſs on certain actions, both of their own and others; they paſs a further judgment; conſidering them, or rather the agent himſelf, as *worthy of puniſhment**: themſelves, if guilty, expecting and dreading puniſhment. Theſe inward perceptions conſtitute what is called the *moral ſenſe*, or a ſenſe of moral good and evil. The preceptions thus planted in our nature, by our creator, plainly ſhow what the divine will is. All wickedneſs is not only a violation of our own conſcience, but a tranſgreſſion of the divine will. For why did God implant ſuch a moral ſenſe in man but becauſe it is his will we ſhould be guided by it? Juſt as he gave us eyes that we might ſee. His will, or what *he would have done*, ſhows what is his moral character. And we may undoubtedly conclude, ſince this moral ſenſe is implanted in us by our creator, that the ſame actions which excite in men a ſenſe of guilt and ſelf-condemnation, are odious and diſpleaſing to God. This will be abundantly confirmed if we reflect that God has ſupreme underſtanding and power,

* Butler, p. 455, 8vo. 1736.

and

and power, and conſider in what manner his unbounded underſtanding and power is exerciſed; not only in the creation of man, as before taken notice of, but alſo in his providence and government of the world. For we may reaſonably ſuppoſe, that he who had wiſdom and power to create the world, would not immediately abandon the work of his own hands to blind chance; but that he would ſupport and direct not only the courſe of the natural world, but that more important and wonderful part of the creation, the moral world. And accordingly the moral ſenſe before-mentioned, is a law written in the hearts of men; a law guarded by penal ſanctions. The terrors of conſcience which bears witneſs againſt men, ſhew that they are by nature (that is, by their creation) placed under a moral governor; one that will puniſh the violations of thoſe laws which he has given them.

But, further, if we attend to what paſſes every day before us, and conſider it as the appointment of God, we ſhall find that God does in an eminent manner actually exerciſe in this preſent life the province of a moral Governor; eſpecially that peculiar province of every Governor, the puniſhing of thoſe who tranſgreſs his laws*. We do not ſay that God's government is complete, and

* Butler's Analogy, p. 52.

juſtice perfectly diſtributed in this preſent world; yet it is ſo conſtituted, as in general to be favourable to virtue; and the miſeries which do here conſtantly follow the violations of God's laws, are with the greateſt reaſon conſidered as penalties which he has annexed to the breach of them. Though the moral Government of God is not perfect in the preſent ſtate, yet the impediments which obſtruct it plainly appear not to be deſigned by God in the ſame ſenſe and manner as thoſe cauſes are deſigned and appointed by him, which promote his moral Government. Theſe impediments do, for the moſt part, ariſe from the perverſeneſs of free agents; and are not properly of God's appointment, though they are permitted by him: And notwithſtanding ſuch impediments, the character of God is plainly that of a righteous Governor *. The wrath of God is fully revealed from Heaven againſt all ungodlineſs and unrighteouſneſs of men. He has determined that tribulation and anguiſh ſhall be upon every ſoul of man that doeth evil, to the Jew firſt, and alſo to the Gentile; ſo that a man ſhall ſay, verily there is a reward for the righteous, doubtleſs there is a God that judgeth the earth.

Admitting then that men are under ſuch a Government, we may define Divine Juſtice to be a

* See Butler's Analogy, Chap ii. and iii.

right

right diſtribution of puniſhments in God's moral Government. It will be a future enquiry how far we are judges of what is a right diſtribution, or what is a due adminiſtration of juſtice.

Here it may be ſaid, What, is God's government all puniſhments, and no rewards? And has juſtice nothing to do with rewards?

What is thus objected to God's government is the caſe with all governments. The laws of this land denounce puniſhment againſt offenders, but promiſe no rewards to any. No one has a penſion given him for being an honeſt man, though many are puniſhed for being rogues. Juſtice holds in her right hand a ſword, not a crown.—The proper reward of obedience to the laws is the protection of the laws. In like manner the happineſs which the laws of God would produce, were they univerſally obeyed, is the natural reward of virtue. The covenant of works promiſes no more. *If a man do them, he ſhall live in them.* Lev. xviii. 5. The covenant of grace indeed is eſtabliſhed upon better promiſes; Chriſtians are taught to expect an exceeding great reward; but then this reward is the GIFT of God through Chriſt. God hath given to us eternal life; and this life is in his ſon, who came, that they who are *His* might not only have life, (what was loſt in Adam) but might *have it more abundantly:*—might have a degree of happineſs far above what Adam

would have enjoyed in Paradiſe, had he never ſinned. The deſcription of the heavenly Jeruſalem, in which *the nations of them which are ſaved ſhall walk*, is far more glorious than that of the earthly Paradiſe.

That a proper diſtinction will be made in the diſtributions of rewards hereafter; and that the future ſtate will not be an inactive one, we may learn from the parable in Luke xix. He who gained ten pounds was made lord over ten cities: he who gained five pounds was made Lord over five cities: And we are told one ſtar differeth from another ſtar in glory. But this is foreign to our ſubject, which is God's punitive juſtice only. Therefore let us now conſider how this differs from holineſs.

Holineſs is a quality of actions, including alſo a principle producing actions;—ſuch a principle as when conſtant and fixed, conſtitutes what we call *character*. Thus we ſay holineſs is a character of God. If it be enquired whence we get the idea of holineſs? the anſwer is, we get the idea of moral good and evil in the way before related; and holineſs is a principle producing a perfect conformity to what is right or morally good; an abhorrence of what is morally evil.

But without entering into critical definitions, it is evident holineſs may be predicated of all the actions

tions of God; it enters into every character he ſuſtains. *He is righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works.* But the attribute of juſtice belongs to him only as moral Governor of the world; and as ſuch, puniſhing the wicked who violate his laws. Holineſs may ſubſiſt where all are equal; ſo the three perſons of the Trinity are invoked, Rev. iv. 8. But juſtice implies an inequality, a ſubordinate ſtate of thoſe that are judged, to the judge himſelf. So Chriſt is ordained to be the judge of the quick and the dead, that is, of all mankind.

The Judges of this land abhor bribes,—always give an upright ſentence, according to law, in criminal caſes as well as civil—Therefore they are *juſt*. But are they alſo *ſaints?* A Bench of Judges is undoubtedly *juſt*; but a Bench of Biſhops is *pious:* The former are *Right Honourable*, but the latter are *Right Reverend.*—We ſee the difference of the ideas from the uſe of the words in common life.

The ideas of holineſs and juſtice then are very diſtinct and different. Juſtice (in the ſupreme Judge) may indeed be accounted a part of univerſal holineſs; yet holineſs may ſubſiſt where there is no room for the exerciſe of juſtice; where juſtice, as a character, can have no place. The Angels are called *holy*, not *juſt*. We have no rea-

ſon to think they are in any way conſtituted judges over men, or over other beings. They are rather repreſented as officers or executioners of divine juſtice, Mark xiii. 27. Mat. xiii. 39, 49.

Beſides juſtice as before defined, there is another ſort of juſtice very different from that we have mentioned. It is what we mean when we ſay of any one that he is an honeſt or a *juſt* man. To do juſtice or to be juſt in this ſenſe, means to render to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; cuſtom to whom cuſtom—To fulfil all engagements and promiſes. Among men this kind of juſtice reſpects property, and the perſonal rights of mankind.

Theſe two ſorts of juſtice are always diſtinguiſhed by the writers on moral philoſophy. The former is called *Juſtitia Attributrix*, or διανεμητικὴ, *Diſtributive Juſtice*; by ſome, *Punitive Juſtice*. It entirely reſpects perſonal merit or demerit. What they call ἀξίαν, *Dignitatem* or *Aptitudinem*, that is, *moral character*. The latter ſort of juſtice is called *Juſtitia Expletrix*, or συναλλακτικὴ, the *juſtice of contracts*; ſometimes *commutative juſtice*; this wholly reſpects the rights of men from whatever fountain they flow. So Grotius (L. i. C. i. S. 8.) *Facultatem reſpicit Juſticia Expletrix*; *Aptitudinem reſpicit Attributrix*.—Where by *Facultatem* he means—*Qualitas moralis*

perfecta ad aliquid juſtè habendum—or, *Jus propriè aut ſtrictè dictum*, as it is explained in Sect. 5th.

Juſtitia Attributrix is alſo called *Juſtitia Aſſignatrix*—*Diſtributive Juſtice*; and *Juſtitia Expletrix* is alſo called *Juſtitia Commutatrix*, *Commutative Juſtice*. See Grotius L. ii. C. xx. S. 1. Par. 2.

Theſe are ſometimes called criminal and civil juſtice, but as it ſeems improperly; criminal juſtice is the right diſtribution of puniſhments in human governments, in civil ſocieties. This we ſhall ſee cannot be wholly regulated by the ſame rules with divine juſtice. Civil juſtice is the deciding and enforcing the civil rights of men in human governments.

Diſtributive juſtice is ſometimes defined thus: *Juſtitia eſt habitus animi, ſuam cuique tribuens dignitatem.* That is, juſtice is a moral quality of the mind, diſpoſing the Judge to render to every man according to his deſerts. In the divine government, this diſpoſition to render to every man according to his moral deſerts, ſeems either to proceed from, or to be a part of the principle we call holineſs.

As to *juſtitia expletrix*, the juſtice ofcontracts, it hath no concern with moral character; it may even ſubſiſt in a ſociety of robbers. A rogue may have as good a title to an eſtate, or a ſum of money, as an honeſt man. It is the part of a

juſt judge to decree the payment of a lawful debt, whatever be the character of the creditor*.

In the divine government this latter ſort of juſtice has a leſs eminent province. Man has not by nature any claims upon God. *For who hath firſt given unto him, and it ſhall be recompenſed unto him again.* If man has any rights of this ſort, they ariſe wholly from the voluntary promiſes of God; from the covenant of grace; a covenant propoſed by God himſelf, out of mercy and love to mankind. What is called the juſtice of contracts, or commutative juſtice between man and man, when applied to the engagements or promiſes of God, is called his *faithfulneſs* and *truth. He is faithful and juſt to forgive us our ſins, and to cleanſe us from all unrighteouſneſs.*

Diſtributive juſtice then, as we ſaid, conſiſts in a right diſpenſation of puniſhments. Two queſtions will be aſked: What ſufferings are we to account puniſhments? and when are puniſhments rightly diſtributed?

Grotius (L. ii. C. xx. C. 1.) defines puniſhment to be *Malum paſſionis, quod infligitur ob malum ac-*

* Gronovius in his notes on Grotius, ſays, *Hæc eſt differentia, quod plus minuſve aliis atque aliis tribuitur per juſtitiam διανεμητικὴν æſtimatis perſonis; per συναλλακτικὴν æſtimatis inter ſe rebus, nullo perſonarum diſcrimine.* Where by *perſona* he means *character*; which is indeed its common uſe. L. ii. C. xx. S. 9.

tionis.

tionis.—The evil we ſuffer for the evil we do*. We are now ſpeaking of thoſe who are under a moral government; therefore the evil here ſpoken of, is what is intentionally inflicted by him who has a right as well as power to puniſh, by the governor of the univerſe.—And that for ſome breach of his laws, here meant by the evil men do. In other words, for ſome ſin of which they are guilty. And this is plainly the uſual and common ſenſe of the word puniſhment†. What-

* A very able writer defines puniſhment to be "a ſuffering inflicted by a judicial proceeding." This he explains to be "What is inflicted by authority and with deſign."—This definition ſurely does not expreſs the uſual ſenſe of the word puniſhment. It has always a reference to the character of him who ſuffers, and who is accounted guilty. It is objected that, according to the definition of Grotius, an innocent perſon cannot be puniſhed. To be ſure, according to that definition, the ſufferings of an innocent perſon are not to be *called* puniſhment; but if he ſuffers in conſequence of a falſe charge, as guilty when not ſo, this may be properly called an unjuſt puniſhment. *See defence of the doctrine of Atonement*, page 89.

It is ſufficient with reſpect to the ſubſequent papers that the word is uſed in the ſenſe given by Grotius, by all who hold the doctrine of penal ſatisfaction.—They ſay that Chriſt ſuffered under a *charge* of ſin; being made guilty, really guilty, by virtue of imputation—and that otherwiſe he could not be *truly* puniſhed.—See Hervey's Dialogues, Dial. 4th.—We ſhall have occaſion to conſider this hereafter.

† *Omnis pœna, ſi juſta eſt, peccati pœna eſt.* Grotius from Auguſtin. L. ii. C. i. S. 1.

ever

ever ſufferings any one may endure, if they have no relation to his own moral conduct, we do not term them puniſhments, but ſimply ſufferings; we ſay in ſuch a caſe it is the man's misfortune, not his fault, through which he ſuffers. So if a man infected by the plague (not through his own fault) ſhould be left to periſh leſt others ſhould be infected, no one would ſay he deſerved this treatment. (See Butler's Anal. p. 455.) And no one would call ſuch a deſertion of him a puniſhment, but an unavoidable misfortune *.

When a tender father ſuffers much loſs in his fortune, and undergoes much pain and vexation to ſave a profligate ſon; we call ſuch ſufferings a misfortune: But if the father has contributed to the profligacy of the ſon, though it be only by neglecting to reſtrain him; we then give the father's ſufferings another name,—ſaying, he *deſerves* them †.

The ſame diſtinction is made in ſcripture. They who ſuffer for righteouſneſs ſake are not conſidered as puniſhed, but as bleſſed of God. The ſufferings of Joſeph are not called a puniſhment, but a trial. The ſufferings of Job were, indeed,

* See Grotius L. ii. C. i. S. 1. *Que incommoda patiuntur aliqui ob morbum contagioſum, proprie poenæ non ſunt.*

† For what is ſometimes called "puniſhing the ſon for the faults of the father," as in the caſe of treaſon. See further on.

charged

charged upon him by his friends as the puniſhment of his ſins; but for this they are reproved by God himſelf.

It may be aſked, how ſhall we know when ſufferings are to be conſidered as puniſhments? —They are puniſhments in all caſes whenever they are the plain conſequences "of the evil we do:" conſequences appointed of God himſelf; and which even in this world follow the breach or neglect of God's laws. And we ought to receive them ourſelves as ſuch, and humble ourſelves under the mighty hand of God, whenever we are conſcious we deſerve them.—They who know themſelves will ſee reaſon enough to believe this to be, for the moſt part, the truth of the caſe. Thoſe ſufferings are puniſhments which we are told by authority are inflicted by God himſelf as ſuch, and are attended with his diſpleaſure.

Having ſettled the idea of puniſhment, we are to enquire when it is rightly diſtributed. The anſwer is, when a due regard is had to moral character; or, as Grotius would ſay, κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, *ſecundum dignitatem.*—But here is difficulty without end—With reſpect to the moral Governor of the univerſe—*Clouds and darkneſs are round about him*;—yet, *righteouſneſs and judgment are the habitation of his throne.*

It will appear at firſt ſight that no one can judge whether diſtributive juſtice be rightly adminiſtered,

miniſtered, unleſs he knew the thoughts of others. The moral character of men's actions depends much on the intentions and thoughts of the heart. The moſt unhappy act that can be committed, that of killing another, admits of various degrees of demerit. It is *murder*, *man-ſlaughter*, or *chance medley*, according to the intention of him who commits it. Nay, with full intention, it may be without demerit, it may be neceſſary ſelf-defence.

But this is but a ſmall difficulty. Suppoſe the intention known—We ſay not with the Stoics "that all faults are equal."—Greater and leſs we muſt admit; but who ſhall ſettle any proportion between them? There are who talk of comparing, and geometrically too*, the demerit of one man with the demerit of another; and in the ſame manner the puniſhment of one man with the puniſhment of another; but all this is juſtly exploded as an impoſſibility, as an abſurd application of mathematical terms†. But waving this, and ſuppoſing it ſenſe to ſay, "that "juſtice is then done, when the puniſhment aſ- "ſigned to different offenders is in the *ſimple ratio* "of their demerit;" who is to ſettle the abſolute quantity as well as the proportion of puniſhment?——A thing ſurely of importance. Still more abſurd, if poſſible, is the making a compariſon (whether mathematical

* See Grotius, L. i. C. i. S. 8.

† Philoſ. Tranſ. Nr. 489.

or

or metaphyſical) between demerit and puniſhment. So it is ſaid, "Finite offences can only be committed by finite creatures in a finite time, and therefore require only a finite puniſhment;" with much nonſenſe of this ſort*; maxims theſe, as we ſhall ſee, contradicted in the adminiſtration of criminal juſtice in every civilized ſtate. So far is it from being true, as ſome fancy, that there is a particular ſort and degree of puniſhment in the nature of things belonging to every particular offence; or, as Grotius moſt abſurdly ſpeaks, an equality between the fault and the puniſhment. (L. ii. C. xx. S. 11. Par. 1.)

* Men in general ſeem to have very little idea of the ill-deſert or demerit of ſin; of the miſchief it does in God's univerſal government.—Your anger waxes hot if a rude fellow inſults your perſon, ſpoils your fine clothes, or defaces the ornaments of your elegant villa. Yet you account it nothing, that the nobleſt work of God, the ſoul of man, created in God's own image, ſhould be ſpoiled and defaced by you. It may be through you that God's juſtice muſt conſign to eternal miſery numbers of ſouls; the ſouls of your children, the ſouls of your ſervants and dependants; nay your own ſoul too; all of them created and intended by their maker for happineſs, and to be inſtruments of his honour and glory.—And *ſhall not the anger of the Lord ſmoke againſt ſuch a man as you?*

Conſider what it is for creatures, moral agents, preſumptuouſly to introdure that confuſion and miſery into the kingdom of God, which mankind, in fact, have introduced. Butler, p. 290.

So

So greatly do diſtributive and commutative juſtice differ, both in their objects and their rules.

With reſpect to the divine government then, we ſay, diſtributive juſtice will be duly adminiſtered, if men be dealt with according to merit and demerit; in ſcripture language, be judged *according to their works*; but what that ACCORDING particularly implies, what the exigencies of the divine government require, (to ſpeak in the language of men) nothing but the wiſdom of God can determine; and nothing but an immediate revelation from God can inform us.

That diſtributive juſtice will be completely adminiſtered in the next world, may be collected from the courſe of God's providence in this; and wicked men have ground enough to apprehend from the power and holineſs of God, that his judgments on obſtinate ſinners will indeed be very tremendous; but the particular nature, the degree, and duration of future puniſhments, can only be known by revelation.

Dr. Clarke ſays much of an *exact proportion* of the *degrees* of puniſhment *. Mathematical proportion can have no place here; as for proportion in any other ſenſe, it only comes to what has been ſaid before, that diſtributive juſtice requires a juſt or proper difference ſhould be made in puniſhments according to moral character. But as

* Clarke's Serm. xvi. and xvii.

to

to the nature or duration of future puniſhments; as to abſolute quantity; juſt or proper degrees or difference of puniſhment, &c. or wherein that difference ſhould (or will) conſiſt; nothing can be determined by any rules of diſtributive juſtice known to us *.

Beſides ſatisfying juſtice and thus vindicating the honour of the ſupreme governor, there are other ends to be anſwered in the diſtribution of puniſhments †. That we know all theſe ends reſpecting the divine univerſal government, or the meaſure of puniſhment neceſſary to effect theſe ends, we have no reaſon to preſume ‡. Some of theſe ends, common both to divine and human governments, we may know. Puniſhments are undoubtedly intended to deter, in ſome caſes, the offender himſelf; in ſome caſes others alſo, from committing the like offences. And theſe

* There is no abſurdity in ſuppoſing future puniſhment may follow wickedneſs in the way of natural conſequence; of courſe, in a due and proper proportion to the demerit of the ſinner; it ſpringing from every one's perſonal and peculiar moral character.

† The manifeſtation of the divine holineſs and hatred of ſin, may be reckoned among the reaſons why ſome are made eternal monuments of God's juſtice. This is a conſideration diſtinct from the other ends of puniſhments.

‡ We are not made acquainted with all the ends or reaſons for which it is fit future puniſhments ſhould be inflicted. Butler, p. 286.

two

two ends ſeem to be all that can be regarded in human governments. The former chiefly in more private ſocieties, the latter chiefly in public. Men are not qualified to exerciſe that higher kind of juſtice we have before ſpoken of.

The primary end for which civil government was inſtituted, is the ſecurity of the perſons and property of the governed; and therefore ſuch puniſhment muſt be inflicted on thoſe who violate either, as may deter both the offender himſelf and others from committing the like. This, and not the moral quality of the action, muſt regulate the penal laws of every ſtate. So the higheſt crime in every ſtate is an attempt to ſubvert the eſtabliſhed government. For this is razing the very foundation of all ſecurity, either to our perſons or properties. Now ſuppoſe any one convinced in his conſcience that the Pretender had a divine hereditary right to the throne of theſe kingdoms —— it was once a ſerious matter—— ſhould think it his duty to depoſe the Elector of Hanover, and ſet up James the Third? The ſinfulneſs of this attempt in ſuch a one may be greatly doubted; the criminality, the treaſon could not. Such a one, of all others, would be moſt dangerous, both in himſelf and in his example; no mercy could be ſhown to him.

The meaſure of puniſhment muſt alſo depend on reaſons of ſtate, and be varied as they vary.

vary. We ſee the puniſhment of the very ſame crime increaſed as the propenſity to it, or the miſchief it does to the community increaſes. So picking of pockets on account of its frequency was lately made capital. So alſo forging bills of exchange, &c. on account of the miſchief it does now trade is increaſed and paper credit becomes neceſſary, is alſo made capital. A man condemned for horſe-ſtealing complained it was hard he ſhould ſuffer death for ſo ſlight a fault. The judge told him he was not hanged for ſtealing an horſe, but that horſes might not be ſtolen. This ſeverity becomes neceſſary, becauſe horſes muſt be left in the open field and without a guard.

There are alſo penal laws in ſupport of religion; but this is only becauſe religion is uſeful to the ſtate*. This indeed is a matter foreign to our purpoſe; which was to ſhew, that in puniſhments when adminiſtered by man, utility rather than morality was to be regarded.—Yet not wholly ſo. God himſelf has appointed the pu-

* It will be ſaid, this is to make religion an engine of ſtate. And ſo it muſt be; it can be nothing elſe in the hands of the civil magiſtrate. And the fitteſt engine in the world it is to promote the great ends for which civil government was inſtituted; ſo fit, that if it did but prevail univerſally, civil government would ſcarce be wanted, and officers of criminal juſtice be altogether unneceſſary.

niſhment for one crime, Gen. ix. 6.* And tho' the law puniſhes offences only as *crimes*, not as vices or as ſins, yet in the execution of the law the morality of the caſe is much attended to.

In one ſociety, that between parents and children, the ſole end of puniſhment is to reſtrain

* The prerogative to kill and make alive, God challenges to himſelf, I. Sam. ii. 6. and will not ſuffer it to be invaded with impunity. No man can give life to the meaneſt reptile; no man is the author of his own life; nor can he continue it according to his own pleaſure. No animal but man (whatever be its ſtate) attempts to put an end to its own life. It may be obſerved there are but three inſtances in the goſpel (except the great one) of a dead perſon's being reſtored to life. Compaſſion ſuddenly raiſed at the ſight of a widow woman who had loſt the only ſupport and comfort of her old age, ſeems to have compelled, as it were, the merciful Jeſus to exert his divine power in her behalf, and call back her ſon from the manſions of the dead. The laſt exertion of this divine power was not only an inſtance of private love and affection, John xi. 36. but it was to give ſuch a public proof of his divine miſſion as ſhould ſtop the mouths of all gainſayers; ſuch a one as indeed haſtened his own cataſtrophe, John xi. 48. Yet even this was introduced with an apology for the exertion of ſo extraordinary a power, John xi. 42.

What ſhall we ſay then to thoſe who in a fit of ill humour and diſguſt throw away their lives, not only without the conſent but in defiance of the governor of the world, becauſe they will not ſubmit to his government, or more properly to his correction, for faults themſelves have committed. Ah! vainly do they think by this means to put an end to their miſery, or eſcape the awful juſtice of God.

the offender; and that more for his own ſake than that of others. Children are therefore to be corrected that they may be amended. This much more reſembles the divine government than the civil government of kingdoms. The moral improvement of our children is the great end of this government. Parents may and ought to puniſh according to moral deſert. They are to reſtrain the growth of evil tempers, to puniſh even wicked deſigns. But then the nearneſs of their ſituation makes them competent judges of the moral deſert of their children. God who has committed to parents an authority abſolute like his own, has alſo endued parents with ſuch prejudices in favour of their own children, as ſecures a mild and merciful exerciſe of ſo great an authority, and makes it in this reſpect reſemble his own.

What has been ſaid amounts to this:

1. Men are endowed with a moral ſenſe. They paſs a diſcriminating judgment both on their own actions and thoſe of others. They not only diſapprove but condemn ſome actions as worthy of puniſhment.

2. Theſe perceptions carry with them the force of a law. They ſhow the mind of the governor of the world both what he requires of man, and his diſpoſition to puniſh thoſe who violate his laws.

3. The visible course of God's providence shows that he is not only disposed to punish the wicked, but that he does actually exercise (we do not say completely in this world) the province of a moral governor, in punishing the disobedient.

4. If certain actions are in their nature worthy of punishment, and there is a being of supreme power who does exercise a moral government over the world by punishments, then there must be such a thing as a right distribution of punishments—there is such a thing as distributive justice, an attribute (as we shall see) belonging to God.

5. Distributive justice is an attribute different and distinct from holiness.

6. Distributive justice differs from commutative justice, which has nothing to do with punishments. Distributive justice respects characters, commutative justice respects things.

7. Men are not able to judge exactly of the character of others; they may judge in some degree, but not perfectly; therefore are not qualified to execute (universally) distributive justice.

8. Though it be true that neither all faults nor all punishments are equal, yet no (mathematical) proportion, no comparison can be instituted between them. Neither is there any connexion or fixed proportion between demerit and its punishment. No precise rule in the nature of the thing whereby we may ascertain either the sort or degree

gree of puniſhment which ſhould be aſſigned to every or any tranſgreſſion of law, whether divine or human.

9. Beſides the general end of diſtributive juſtice in vindicating the honour of God, there are alſo other particular ends to be anſwered in the diſtribution of puniſhments. That we know all theſe ends, or what ſort or degree of puniſhment is neceſſary to effect any one of theſe ends, is improbable.

10. For theſe three laſt reaſons men are utterly unqualified to decide on God's diſtributive juſtice. Hereafter they may be made to ſee with aſtoniſhment and conviction the greatneſs and the propriety of the divine juſtice; for God will not only execute judgment upon all that are ungodly, but convince ſinners themſelves of all their ungodly deeds, and their hard ſpeeches which they have ſpoken againſt him.

Here it will be ſaid, if we know not the particulars in which divine juſtice conſiſts, how can we know when it is, or whether it will be rightly adminiſtered?

We may anſwer, (*a priori*) God can neither be biaſſed by evil affections, nor allured by ſinful appetites. He can neither be corrupted by bribes, nor awed by a ſuperior power. In ſhort, *God will not be unjuſt*; and with this negative proof we muſt in part be content. But further; God

is both qualified and diſpoſed to execute juſtice. He is the fountain of all power, knowledge, and wiſdom. He knows not only the actions and characters of men, but all the various ends and purpoſes of his own univerſal government, and the fitteſt means of effecting them, and as far as puniſhments are a proper means, he has wiſdom to adapt them to their end, and power to inflict them. His holineſs and hatred of ſin will ever diſpoſe him to puniſh the wicked; and it is an eminent part of the province of a moral governor rightly to diſtribute puniſhments. It is thus he gets Him honour upon thoſe *which would not that he ſhould reign over them.* Luke xix. 27.

We further anſwer, *(a poſteriori)* that we do ſee diſtributive juſtice in part now adminiſtered. Even now judgment is laid to the line, and righteouſneſs to the plummet. We ſee miſery in various degrees for the moſt part following the breach of God's laws. Where this is not the caſe, where wickedneſs proſpers, it is not according to the natural order of things, and the laws God has eſtabliſhed. Men are permitted to croſs the inclination of God, to interrupt his government in a certain degree, and for a certain time. Were men forcibly reſtrained in all caſes, they would not be free agents, nor this a ſtate of trial. Upon the whole we may plainly ſee the traces " of a moral quality, diſpoſing the governour of

" the

"the world to render to every man according to "his deſerts;" which is the very definition of diſtributive juſtice.

Although the juſtice of God is often aſſerted in ſcripture, yet it is always in general terms; we are not qualified to underſtand it particularly. Gen. xviii. 25. Shall not the judge of all the earth do right? Pſ. xcviii. 9. With righteouſneſs ſhall he judge the world, and the people with equity. Rom. ii. 6. God will render to every man according to his deeds, &c. to the Jew firſt, and alſo to the Gentile. For there is no reſpect of perſons with God. Many particular inſtances of God's puniſhing the wicked in an exemplary manner in this world, and at the ſame time delivering the righteous out of the overthrow of the wicked, are recorded in ſcripture. The regular adminiſtration of diſtributive juſtice among the Jews, under the theocracy, cannot be drawn into example ſo as to warrant an expectation of the like regularity of temporal judgments; yet it is a proof that perfect juſtice was then, and will be on the whole, the rule of God's government. "The general government of providence was "epitomized in the particular ſuperintendence of "the Deity over this diſtinguiſhed people *." The juſtice of God reſpecting all mankind, of what-

* White's Sermons at Bampton's Lecture, VIII.

ever age or nation, whether Jew or Gentile, whether they had more or fewer opportunities of knowing their Lord's will, whether they have done more or less of their Lord's will, whatever be their moral character, whether penitent or impenitent—I say, the complete justice of God respecting all, will be manifested in the end; when the redeemed shall sing the song of Moses and the Lamb, saying, Great and marvellous are thy works Lord God Almighty. JUST and TRUE are thy ways thou King of Saints.

APPENDIX.

THE difference between distributive and commutative justice is so great in their nature and their rules, and yet they are so often confounded, that it may not be amiss to point out that difference in some striking particulars.

And first, one has for its object the distribution of punishments; the other the distribution of property; the ascertaining and enforcing men's rights.

The one affects men's persons, the other their possessions or privileges. The one is regulated by moral character, the other by natural or acquired rights.

Distributive

Diſtributive juſtice allows of no ſubſtitute; no man can ſuffer pain (that is puniſhment) by deputy. Again, no man's obnoxiouſneſs to puniſhment, or what is due to diſtributive juſtice, can by any power be alienated or made due from another. This obnoxiouſneſs ariſes from a man's own moral character, his own ill deſert; but a man's own ill deſert cannot be made the ill deſert of another. A man cannot be made guilty of what he has never committed. There are who deny all this; but this is to confound all moral character; and totally annihilate diſtributive juſtice, which pretends to diſtribute puniſhments according to perſonal character. Perſonal character, whether of man or a ſuperior being, is nothing, if it can be put off one perſon and put on another, like our clothes. In commutative juſtice the caſe is far otherwiſe—the debt of one man may be diſcharged by another. Juſtice is ſatisfied if the creditor obtains his juſt due. Juſtice reſpects only the right of the creditor, not the perſon of the debtor. Hence the debtor may have a ſubſtitute or ſurety; one who takes upon him the payment of the debt on failure of the debtor. And thus alſo the debtor's obligation to payment may be transferred to another, and the debtor wholly diſcharged, if the creditor will accept of the transfer, for the debt can be paid but once; and if it be once paid, whether by a ſurety who undertakes

undertakes the payment conditionally, or a ſubſtitute who undertakes it abſolutely, the creditor gets his whole due, and juſtice is fully done. The creditor may alſo alienate his right to the debt to another. It is no matter to the debtor to whom he makes the payment, he muſt pay the whole debt, and he pays no more, whether to the creditor or his aſſignee.

Again, every debt or due, which is the object of commutative juſtice, can be aſcertained. It can be told in this caſe exactly what is due to juſtice. But in the caſe of tranſgreſſions, whether againſt divine or human laws, no one can ſay what is by nature due to juſtice; there is not in the nature of things for every different tranſgreſſion a ſpecific puniſhment, either in kind or degree.

Again, in the caſe of commutative juſtice, an equivalent to what is due can almoſt always be aſcertained. So the Lord commanded the inſolvent debtor, and all that he had to be ſold, and then exact payment could be made. Not ſo in diſtributive juſtice. In puniſhments identity is ſcarce poſſible; but as to equality, proportion, &c. even in puniſhments of the ſame kind, much more of different kinds, it is utterly impoſſible to aſcertain any thing. Divine juſtice does indeed weigh merit and demerit, (Dan. v. 27.) rewards and puniſhments, nay, and events too. But who

who holds the golden ſcales, and adjuſts the weights? Not man, but God.

The ends of diſtributive and commutative juſtice are alſo very different. One end of puniſhment is to deter others from ſinning, and many other ends there are of which we are ignorant, none of which have place in commutative juſtice. Nothing therefore is ſo unreaſonable as to argue from the rules and practice of commutative juſtice among men, what is or what may be the rule of diſtributive juſtice with God. This abſurdity abounds in the writers on penal ſatisfaction, who, as they expreſsly mention the terms commutative and diſtributive juſtice, one would ſuppoſe underſtood the diſtinction between them, unleſs they are purpoſely confounded. See Hervey's Dialogues, page 69 and 200, Lond. edit. Page 57, 162, Eding. edition.

ESSAY

ESSAY III.

On Mercy, as an Attribute of God.

WE come now to conſider another attribute of the Deity, which ſeems half denied by ſome, by others perverted to the worſt of purpoſes,—made a refuge and an encouragement to ſin. By mercy we mean, *ſparing thoſe who deſerve puniſhment*;—thoſe who, according to the law of diſtributive juſtice, ought to be puniſhed. This is both the common and ſcriptural ſenſe of the word.—Not to puniſh thoſe who do not deſerve puniſhment, is not mercy but juſtice. Mercy then is plainly an interruption, an arreſt of juſtice. Here ſome raiſe immenſe difficulties how ſuch contrary attributes can belong to God. Not a few virtually (though not in direct terms) deny, ſome the one, ſome the other, in God's government. Yet men find no difficulty in admitting what is analogous, or rather the ſame in human governments. The executive part of the law of this land, or the adminiſtration of criminal juſtice is committed to the King. He has alſo (with ſome limitations) a power of pardoning thoſe

thoſe who, according to law, and in ſtrict juſtice, ſhould be executed. This is plainly a diſpenſing power; yet formidable as the name is, we think it may be exerciſed without overturning law, or annihilating juſtice; nay may be exerciſed in ſuch a manner as to be conducive to the general ends of civil government. All acts of mercy then are exceptions from the general rule of juſtice; and we ſay proverbially, there is no general rule without an exception. We allow this in human governments, and it may be allowed with equal reaſon in the divine government.

There are who attempt to reconcile juſtice and mercy in this way. God, ſay they, may certainly accept leſs than is due; may not a creditor remit a debt without injuſtice?—They who thus repreſent puniſhment as a debt due to God, conſider it as beneficial to God, juſt as property is to man; and ſo ſubſtitute the laws of commutative juſtice in the room of the laws of diſtributive juſtice. If you ſay God may accept leſs than the laws of diſtributive juſtice require, then complete juſtice is not done, and the laws of ſtrict juſtice are in part diſpenſed with, to give way to mercy.

Grotius ſays, though the guilty may be puniſhed without doing them any wrong, yet it does not follow that every guilty perſon muſt be puniſhed, L. ii. C. xx. S. 4. That is, juſtice only

permits,

permits, not *requires* that offenders ſhould be puniſhed. But Grotius expreſsly reſtrains this to criminal juſtice in civil ſocieties. To apply this to God's moral attribute, would be to reduce it to nothing. Juſtice is a moral quality diſpoſing the Deity actually to puniſh all wickedneſs without exception;—whether or no we can reconcile this with a diſpoſition (in ſome caſes) not to puniſh at all, Rom. ix. 15. is another matter.

In all probability this difficulty, this ſeeming contradiction, ariſes wholly from our ſcanty conceptions; poſſibly only from the ſcantineſs of language. Had we a clearer knowledge of the divine nature, did we underſtand more perfectly the divine government, the grounds and reaſons of every diſpenſation, theſe ſeeming contrarieties might vaniſh, the whole might appear the uniform effect, the plain conſequence of one grand principle. Some divines have conſidered all the attributes of God as comprized under one grand principle, which they call the *Divine rectitude*; operating on different occaſions in different ways, to which different modes of operation we give different names. When the divine rectitude is exerted in one manner, we call it juſtice; when in another we call it mercy. "So God had de-
"nounced an awful judgment againſt Nineveh.
"—*Yet forty days and Nineveh ſhall be overthrown.*
"But moved by their repentance and prayer, *he did*

" *did it not.* Had the punishment been then in-
" flicted, it would have been an example of God's
" justice; but being averted or delayed, it was
" an instance of God's mercy *."

In contradiction to this notion of divine mercy, we are told by certain divines of the " inflexible " justice of God; of his unalterable purpose of " dealing with sinners according to his declara- " tions.—That justice MUST BE SATISFIED, and " the law fulfilled.—That the character of God " admits of NO variation," &c. †

If by these or the like expressions no more is meant than that God's justice is not to be turned aside by corrupt motives, nor his purposes altered through changeable affections—*That he is not a man that he should repent*, every one will assent. But if by these expressions given out with an air of authority, and continually insisted upon, it be meant that the penal sanctions of God's laws must always take place in the very terms they are denounced, (and in any other terms would

* Ogden on Prayer. Serm. III.

† Preface to the Complete Duty of Man. Hervey's Dialogues, page 140, Lond. edit. Page 113, Eding edit.

The sentence of death pronounced on Adam, and all his posterity, was (at least) temporal death; yet God was pleased to dispense with this in two instances.—The governor of the universe is not to be tied up by the cobweb rules of these divines.

imply

imply a variation) then mercy becomes impoſſible.

The wages of ſin is death—eternal death—This is the ſanction of God's unchangeable law, and is *declared* in general terms againſt all ſinners whatever *. The purpoſes of God in his government are unalterable; *the counſel of the Lord ſtandeth for ever:* All the purpoſes of the Lord ſhall take place, particularly that of finally bringing every work into judgment. But if you underſtand—"God's purpoſe of dealing with ſinners "according to theſe declarations againſt them,*" to be in ſuch a ſenſe *unalterable*, as that the ſentence of the law MUST be executed on all without exception, you not only make God's declarations, at different times, inconſiſtent, but alſo make redemption itſelf impoſſible †.

It muſt be acknowledged, that thoſe who hold the juſtice of God to be *thus* inflexible, have a ſcheme; according to which, as they ſay, "God "can inflict his righteous vengeance, and fully "exerciſe his punitive juſtice; and that man ſhall "ſuffer the puniſhment threatened to his crime ‡." —In ſhort, that complete juſtice ſhall take place,

* Complete Duty of Man——Preface.

† Upon juſt ſuch a notion as this of the *immutability* of God, and his *unalterable purpoſes*, do ſome maintain that prayer is utterly uſeleſs.

‡ Hervey's Dialogues, p. 147, and p. 66, Lond. edit.

and

and yet elect ſinners ſuffer nothing; and this conſiſtently with our notions of diſtributive juſtice —For the whole purport of their ſcheme is to reconcile divine juſtice with divine mercy; human reaſon being the judge. This ſcheme we ſhall fully conſider preſently.

We proceed to conſider further this attribute of mercy. Now mercy is from the nature of the thing a free gift. Had a criminal a right to mercy, it would not be mercy but juſtice to ſtop the execution. No man hath (by nature) a right to mercy; ſuch a right is in fact a right to ſin with impunity. Nor can any one, without the moſt dangerous preſumption, take God's mercy to himſelf. Were a man to ſay—"I will indulge "my appetite in ſuch or ſuch intemperance;— "or I will gratify my pride in ſuch or ſuch ex- "travagance. It is true the puniſhment accord- "ing to ſtrict juſtice is loſs of health and loſs of "ſubſtance, but God is merciful—I ſhall not be ſick "—I ſhall not be reduced."—I ſay were a man to argue thus, with reſpect to God's diſpenſations in this world only, we ſhould be at a loſs to ſay whether the madneſs or impiety of the man was moſt.—And what ſhall we ſay to thoſe who argue juſt in this manner reſpecting God's diſpenſations in the world to come, which are abſolutely determined and fully known to us?

Mercies being exceptions to the law of juſtice cannot be diſpenſed by any general rule. It muſt depend on the nature of every particular caſe, the purpoſes and exigencies of government, whether mercy ſhould be granted or not; of this the ſupreme governor alone is the judge.

Beſides the diſpenſation of particular mercies to individuals whoſe caſes may differ, there is another diſpenſation to numbers; to numbers falling under one and the ſame particular deſcription. In human governments, beſides mercy to individuals, in caſes where multitudes are involved in the ſame guilt, pardon is offered to all ſuch of the guilty as will comply with certain conditions. So it is in the divine government. Mercy in various ſhapes, both ſpiritual and temporal, is ſhown to individuals. A man is unexpectedly reclaimed from a ſinful courſe of life, or recovers from a dangerous ſickneſs; and ſurely theſe are mercies —mercies he had no right to demand—mercies he could not foreſee—neither one nor the other was promiſed him. And of this ſort are moſt of the particular mercies vouchſafed to us in the courſe of God's providence here: they are not promiſed beforehand, nor what we have any right to look for. But the mercies through Chriſt are of another ſort. They ariſe from a covenant, the covenant of grace; and may be expected according to the terms of that covenant,

" repent-

"repentance towards God, and faith towards our "Lord Jeſus Chriſt." The offer of ſuch a covenant is the exceeding great mercy, the free grace of God. We are alſo informed, through whom it is, that we obtain ſuch great mercy, through our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, who gave himſelf a ranſom for all. We are told what this ranſom was; we are not redeemed with ſilver and gold, but with the precious blood of Chriſt. Here then we may learn what our expectations are, what the terms of mercy, what the love of Chriſt, conſequently what our obligations and duty to him. And it is equally preſumptuous to apply theſe promiſed mercies to ourſelves on our own terms, as to apply the unpromiſed ones at all; or to entertain a vague idea that ſomehow or other we ſhall find mercy in Chriſt, without any care or concern of ours; as is too commonly done.

We come now to conſider the proofs of the divine mercy: theſe, like thoſe of the divine juſtice, are partly *à priori*, and partly *à poſteriori*.

The ſame inward feelings which move us to condemn ſinful acts as deſerving puniſhment, accounting it right that the governor of the world ſhould puniſh thoſe who violate his laws; teach us alſo that in particular caſes it MAY be right to delay, mitigate, or wholly ſuſpend thoſe puniſhments. Neither ſuffering ſin in general to go

unpuniſhed, nor yet in all caſes executing the full rigour of juſtice.

What has been ſaid of the divine juſtice is applicable to the divine mercy. That God is both diſpoſed and qualified to exerciſe this attribute properly. He is unbiaſſed by evil affection; he poſſeſſes, in a ſupreme degree, power, knowledge, wiſdom, and holineſs: therefore his mercies will be diſpenſed upon ſuch grounds and reaſons, and in ſuch a manner as is moſt proper, moſt ſuitable to an holy government, and moſt conducive to ends of his government.

His goodneſs or benevolence will diſpoſe him to ſhow mercy wherever it is fit and proper, or *can be made ſo*, whenever it is or can be made conſiſtent with his other attributes and his univerſal government *.

But we ſee that in fact mercy is exerciſed in God's moral government over this preſent world. The miſery which, by God's appointment, follows the commiſſion of ſin, is undoubtedly part of its puniſhment. By the rules of ſtrict juſtice it might follow immediately and in full meaſure; yet how often is it delayed, how often mitigated, ſometimes wholly averted? The natural conſequence of vice, as appointed by the general laws of God's government, is (ſooner or later) miſery; yet in

* Ez. xviii. 32. II. Pet. iii. 9.

many

many particular inſtances, and to a certain degree, theſe conſequences are prevented; not by the repentance of the offender, but by the interpoſition of other perſons, who in pity to the ſufferer take the calamity or ſuffering upon themſelves; take the conſequences, not the guilt of the ſin, (for that we hold impoſſible) upon themſelves. In many caſes alſo proviſion is made in the courſe of nature for the recovery of perſons who have involved themſelves in calamities by their vices. Thus compaſſion is provided for miſery, medicines for diſeaſes, friends againſt enemies *; all which plainly ſhows, that even here the general courſe of divine juſtice is often ſuſpended; and that by circumſtances, juſt as much appointed of God, as the miſery that follows vice is of his appointment.

It may be obſerved that the bad conſequences which naturally follow our vices, can ſeldom be prevented, or even alleviated, by the perſons themſelves who are guilty, and who are obnoxious to puniſhment on that account. If ſuch perſons obtain any relief, it is almoſt always through the aſſiſtance of others: an aſſiſtance which natural compaſſion implanted in man for that purpoſe, diſpoſes us to afford to the miſerable, whatever be the cauſe of their miſery.

* Butler's Analogy, p. 431, edit. 8vo. 1736.

A man by luxurious and extravagant living reduces himſelf to want and beggary. How are his affairs retrieved?—Not by any thing he himſelf does or can do. The manner of life he has led not only indiſpoſes him to buſineſs of every kind, but has really made him unfit and incapable of it. He has had no experience of buſineſs, and now cannot learn. The very cauſe of all his calamity (his diſſipated and idle turn of mind) makes him utterly incapable of helping himſelf. No! (POSSIBLY) ſome diſtant relation, ſome old friend of his father's, hears of his misfortunes, and moved with compaſſion, finds him out in his obſcure retreat, and at great trouble and expence (through much ſuffering) retrieves his embarraſſed affairs, and once more ſets him up in the world; and oh! that with a new fortune he could alſo give him a new diſpoſition! oh! that ſuch a man could be *born again* —very few bankrupts that become ſo merely thro' their vices, but what become bankrupts again and again.*

Therefore

* Juſt in the ſame way are ſinners incapable by nature of repentance and amendment; incapable of redeeming themſelves, could repentance alone effect it. With reaſon do we pray that God would *give* us true repentance and the grace of his holy ſpirit to amend our lives. Acts v. 31.

Neither

Therefore in the adminiſtration of God's moral government, mercy as well as juſtice are plainly ſeen. Nor muſt we ſay it is contrary to the attribute of juſtice, inflexible as you may pleaſe to term it, that the puniſhments it demands are not always inflicted on the offender. And when the offender does eſcape through the ſufferings of another, yet thoſe ſufferings are neither in kind nor degree exactly what would have fallen on the offender himſelf*. And they are never attended with that conſciouſneſs of guilt, that ſelf-condemnation, remorſe, and inward ſhame which the offender alone can feel, and which are the inſeparable companions of ſin. Nor with the diſpleaſure of God, which ever lights on the offender only.

We may further obſerve, that where the releaſe of a wicked man from puniſhment is owing

Neither are they reformed who are condemned to the *hulks*: the company they keep only makes them more expert and more hardened in villainy. What reaſon to ſuppoſe (as ſome do) that the devils themſelves will (naturally) repent?

* A tender father ſuffers anxiety of mind, fatigue of body, and much expence to procure the releaſe of a wicked ſon from an ignominious death, the juſt ſentence of the law. Are the ſufferings of the father exactly ſuch as would have fallen on the ſon? Or is it neceſſary for the ſon's releaſe that the father ſhould ſuffer that very ſentence which the law denounced on the ſon?

to the ſufferings of others, they to whom he owes his diſcharge are always innocent with reſpect to thoſe crimes or vices which have occaſioned his miſery. Should an aſſociate in his crimes, ſhould a man of the like bad character with himſelf attempt to interfere, or to intercede, he would be rejected with anger and diſdain.

If then we argue from the analogy of God's government, we may conclude, that the conſequences of men's ſins may not follow immediately, and yet may reach them in another world. That nothing ſinners themſelves can do will either prevent or delay their puniſhment. That if their puniſhment be prevented, (that is, mercy be ſhewn) it will be through another; one who is innocent, and who voluntarily ſubmits to great ſufferings to redeem them from miſery. That what he thus ſuffers may likely be very different both in kind and degree from what ſinners themſelves would have ſuffered: and laſtly, though he takes upon him to ſuffer for their ſakes, or if you pleaſe in their ſtead, yet he neither does, nor can, in any ſenſe, take upon himſelf their guilt.

It would be endleſs to quote all thoſe paſſages of ſcripture where this attribute of mercy is aſſerted in expreſs terms. Both juſtice and mercy are in ſome places aſcribed to God at the ſame time. Pſalm lxxxix, 14. David ſays, (Pſ. ci.) "I will

"will ſing of mercy and judgment," and no man had more reaſon; no man in this preſent life experienced more of both than he did.—But there is another paſſage of ſcripture which we muſt conſider more particularly. Exodus xxxiv. 6.—*The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long ſuffering, and abundant in goodneſs and truth; keeping mercy for thouſands, forgiving iniquity, tranſgreſſion, and ſin; and that will by no means clear the guilty; viſiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children, unto the third and to the fourth generation* *.

Hervey in his Dialogues (Dial. iv. p. 147, Lond. edit. Page 118, Edinb. edit.) ſays, "this "text is not without its difficulties."—It has no difficulty but to thoſe who will have all the divine attributes reconciled to their own conceptions. Hervey tranſlates it thus: "Pardoning iniquity, tranſgreſſion, and ſin, though not with impunity;—or rather—though he will by no means let IT go unpuniſhed,—meaning ſin."—And the ſenſe (as Hervey ſays) will be as follows:—"Though God pardon ſin, yet IT ſhall "not go unpuniſhed. He will certainly inflict his

* It is remarkable with what partiality this text is quoted by different perſons. The author of the Appeal, &c. quotes only the former part; "God is merciful, &c." Others quote only the latter part; "God will by no means "clear the guilty.

righteous

"righteous vengeance, and exerciſe his punitive "juſtice, though not on the ſinner whom he "ſpares, yet on the SURETY whom He has pro-"vided."

We ſhall take no notice of the flat contradiction in terms in this tranſlation, nor that the interpretation is unſupported by other parts of ſcripture, but enquire on what occaſion theſe memorable words were ſpoken, as neceſſary to lead us to their true ſenſe. If words are taken in a detached way without any regard to the context, or to the time or occaſion on which they were ſpoken, no ſkill in Hebrew criticiſm will lead us to their true meaning.

Theſe words were ſpoken, nay—they were ſolemnly proclaimed by God himſelf to the whole body of the Jewiſh people, when He made a particular covenant *with them only*, not with all mankind. This covenant was made in the wilderneſs of Sinai; the Jews only were preſent. Though all the earth is God's, yet THEY were to be a treaſure unto him above all other people. Exod. xix. 5. xxiv. 8. The Lord who was their God, was alſo to be their King, their Chief Magiſtrate. I. Sam. xii. 12.

When this covenant was finally concluded, Ex. xxxiv. 10. (for it was once nigh broken off, Ex. xxxii. 10. xxxiii. 1.) then God proclaims to the people his character, not only as their God, but

but their King alſo;—that he will execute juſtice tempered with mercy in his government over them.——That he would *viſit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children, unto the third and to the fourth generation*;—a mode of puniſhment that could have place only in an earthly government; neither had it place among the Jews after God ceaſed to be their immediate civil governor. Jer. xxxi. 29. Ez. xviii.

Now, where is the propriety on this occaſion to tell the Jews, that though their own ſins ſhould not be puniſhed in their own perſons, yet IT, meaning ſin, (in the abſtract) ſhould be puniſhed ſome ages after in the perſon of one ſcarce known, even by Types, to the common Jews? For neither their code of laws, Ex. xxi—xxiii, nor the tabernacle ſervice, Ex. xxiv—xxxi. were then eſtabliſhed. Can any one imagine that God is here defending his attribute of juſtice, while he thus pardons iniquity, tranſgreſſion, and ſin? or explaining to the Jews how his mercy and juſtice could conſiſt together? No! when God thus appears in public before the people in all the terror of majeſty, he condeſcends not to apologies and explanations, but aſſerts his attributes, both His mercy and His juſtice.

The interpretation is contrary to the whole tenor of the Scripture-Hiſtory of the Jewiſh people, both as individuals and as a nation. Mer-

cies

cies are promiſed, and puniſhments threatened in their own perſons; puniſhments to be inflicted in this preſent world. Exod. xxiii. 25. Levit. xxvi. Deut. xxviii. Particularly Deut. xxix. 18, 21. Examples of juſtice executed on individuals, and their deſcendants too, both before and under their government by God's vicegerents, their kings, are frequent. I. Sam. ii. 32, 33. iii. 13. xii. 25. xv. 28. II. Sam. xii. 10.

God's punitive juſtice exerciſed on this people as a nation in their own perſons, is thus recorded in Pſ. lxxviii. *When they grieved him with their hill-altars, and provoked him to diſpleaſure with their images; then he delivered their power into captivity, and their beauty into the enemies hand.* God's mercies to this people (as a nation under his immediate temporal government) are thus recorded.—*But* (for all their hypocriſy and diſſembled repentance) *he was ſo merciful that he forgave their miſdeeds, and deſtroyed them not. Yea many a time turned he his wrath away, and would not ſuffer his whole diſpleaſure to ariſe.* Of God's mercy to individuals (and that in the midſt of judgment) we ſhall mention only one inſtance out of many.—*Seeſt thou* (ſays God to Elijah) *how Ahab humbleth himſelf before me; becauſe he humbleth himſelf before me, I will not bring the evil* (before denounced on Ahab perſonally) *in his days; but in his ſon's days will I bring the evil upon his houſe*; or, upon his deſcend-

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ants. That is, he ſhall not, like Zedekiah, have the great affliction of ſeeing his ſons put to death before his eyes *.

The hiſtory ſo perfectly correſponds to God's declaration (Ex. xxxiv. 6.) that no one can doubt but it relates to God's government over the Jews, not to the expiation of ſin by the ſufferings of the Meſſiah.

As God himſelf was the ſupreme civil magiſtrate of the Jews, no doubt their peculiar polity (in which religious and civil duties were often united) was perfectly adminiſtered. Thoſe who have ſuch difficulties about reconciling juſtice with mercy in God's temporal government over this one people, will have the ſame about reconciling theſe attributes in God's univerſal government; eſpecially that part of it which relates to the redemption of mankind. No wonder they think *here* is ſomething that wants explaining, and give us (as Hervey ſays) "a PLAN accord-"ing to which all the attributes harmonize.

* David, who by his office was to ſtudy the law, Deut. xvii. 19, and lived under the Theocracy, often alludes to both. So Pſ. xv. 5, alludes to Deut. xxxiii. 19. Pſ. xviii. 20—24. xxxvii. 9, 10. 36. lv. 23, refer to Ex. xxiii. 25, 26. Deut. xxviii. 20, 22. I. Sam. ii. 33, &c.

There are who ſlight this notion of a Theocracy, and give a different ſenſe to David's Pſalms. See Horne on the Pſalms. Where every verſe of every Pſalm is made to relate to the Meſſiah.

"Every

"Every attribute is glorified; not one superseded, no nor so much as clouded." Hervey, Dial. iv. p. 141, Lond. edit. p. 114, Edinb. edit.—Yet for all this it will be found, that they explain no one apparent difficulty, and raise up many real ones; the offspring of their boasted plan.

Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection? It is as high as Heaven, what canst thou do? Deeper than Hell, what canst thou know?

ESSAY

ESSAY IV.

On the Doctrine of Satisfaction.

Neither reaſon nor analogy can ſhow how, *or* in what particular way, *the interpoſition of Chriſt, as revealed in ſcripture, is of that efficacy which it is there repreſented to be; yet this is no kind nor degree of preſumption againſt its being really of that efficacy.* Butler's Analogy, page 432, edit. 8vo. 1736.

THE doctrine of atonement by the blood of Chriſt, viz. *that Chriſt through the eternal Spirit offered himſelf to God*—and that *God was in Chriſt reconciling the world unto himſelf*, is received by many with difficulty. And it is, to be ſure, of an amazing magnitude, not viſibly connected with any of the truths of natural religion, and utterly unlike what men would imagine, were they to contrive a ſcheme of reconciliation between God and man. They would probably propoſe ſomething to be done or ſuffered by the offender himſelf; not any thing to be done, much leſs ſuffered by another; leaſt of all by a perſon of ſuch an exalted nature as Chriſt, both God and man.

Yet

Yet he muſt have narrow notions who will admit nothing for truth but what has a manifeſt connection with that pittance of knowledge he is poſſeſſed of, and believe no facts but what are analogous to his own confined experience.

They who deny the doctrine of atonement make ſhort work with all its difficulties; but then they ſubject themſelves to more, and greater, by rejecting the evidence for the divine authority on which that doctrine ſtands. And of this evidence men are competent judges; it can be forced upon them as much as a demonſtration of Euclid: but of the neceſſity of ſuch a ſacrifice as that of Chriſt, to make reconciliation and forgiveneſs proper, or even poſſible in the divine government; men are no judges at all *. And ſhall we

* Two things were neceſſary for our ſalvation: the forgiveneſs of ſins paſt in order to our deliverance from the wrath of God, and the eternal torments of the next life; and the reformation of our hearts and lives to make us capable of eternal life and happineſs in another world.—And both theſe, if God had ſo pleaſed, might, *for any thing we certainly know to the contrary*, have been effected by the abundant mercy and powerful grace of God, without this wonderful method and diſpenſation of ſending his ſon in our nature to take away ſin by the ſacrifice of himſelf. But it ſeems the wiſdom of God thought fit to pitch upon this way, and no doubt for very good reaſons. *Tillotſon*, Sermon xlvii. p. 554, folio edit. See alſo Butler's Analogy, Part II. Chap v. Sect. vii. Page 306, 8vo. 1736.

decide on a doctrine, of the probability or truth of which we know nothing, *à priori*, and yet refuſe to hear teſtimony, of the validity of which we are proper judges? It may be ſaid ſuch a doctrine as that of the atonement of Chriſt is very ſtrange: this indeed may be true, but "if you deny "what is ſtrange, you muſt admit what is impoſ- "ſible*.

Others admit the authority of ſcripture, yet ſeem not ſatisfied with the ſcripture account; they ſeem to think it defective, and abſurdly attempt to ſupply its defects. Eager to "vin- "dicate the ways of God to man," they ſet up explanations fetched from the faſhionable philoſophy of the times, and grounded on arbitrary aſſumptions. And theſe explanations paſs current with many on account of the piety of their authors,—or the confidence with which they are urged.

One difficulty there is to reconcile theſe philoſophical explanations with ſcripture—but this is eaſily done. A figurative expreſſion in one of the prophets, or a ſcripture metaphor applied in an unſcriptural way, will always do the buſineſs.

Were theſe explanations always propoſed with that modeſty they ought to be, were they offered only as humble attempts to unfold the wiſdom

* Dr. Ogden.

and juſtice of God in the wonderful work of redemption, we ſhould be obliged to thoſe who took ſuch laudable pains, whatever might be their ſucceſs. And while both parties admitted the doctrine of redemption, whether with or without the comment, they might hold one common faith in the unity of ſpirit, and in the bond of peace; and they would regard one another as members of the ſame body, the head of which is Chriſt. But, alas! the caſe is far different. Men become enamoured of the offspring of their own brain. Expounders of myſteries are apt to grow arrogant and proud; are offended with all that will not receive their wiſe explanation; and throw out hints that ſuch believe nothing at all of the doctrine of redemption *.

Nor is this the worſt of the matter. For when men thus undertake to explain what the ſcripture has not explained, and to reconcile this wonderful diſpenſation to their ſcanty notions of the divine juſtice, they not only put the moſt abſurd ſenſe on the plaineſt paſſages of ſcripture, but lay down principles, ſome of them repugnant to common ſenſe, others ſubverſive of all religion whatever. It is the abſurd and preſumptuous poſiti-

* "He who rejects the doctrine of the imputation of man's ſin to our Saviour, (in the way there explained) does, by ſo doing, reject the doctrine of the expiation likewiſe."

Hervey's Dialogues, p. 182, quoted from Staynoe.

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ons of these men taken for genuine scripture, that has furnished out most of the objections brought against the doctrine of atonement, and much discredited the gospel of Christ *.

The explanation of the way in which the death of Christ was of any efficacy in procuring the pardon of sin, called the *doctrine of penal satisfaction*, is of great antiquity. It has been patronized by men of unquestionable learning and piety. Among these the two leading reformers, Calvin and Luther; all the Puritans; many churchmen of the last age, and some of this. It is fully explained, from the writings of the most eminent Puritan divines †, and defended as well as it can be by the late Mr. Hervey in his Dia-

* "You have been taught by divines (says the author "of the Appeal) that if Christ be not God, he cannot "have made an *infinite satisfaction* for the sins of mankind." —And who are these divines who talk of an *infinite satisfaction?*——Hervey's Dial. iv. p. 157.——"An infinite me- "diator atoned. Finite creatures can never make infinite "satisfaction."——Again. "It is a contradiction to be- "lieve the real, and consequently infinite satisfaction to "divine justice made by the death of Christ, without be- "lieving him to be very God of very God." Scott's *Force of Truth*, p. 116.——This is not the language of the apostles; but the apostles were no metaphysicians.

† Owen, Charnock, Goodwin, Howe, Bates, Flavel, Caryl, Manton, Poole, &c. page 152, Edinb. edit. of Hervey's Dialogues. A character of their writings is there given.

logues, called *Theron* and *Aſpaſio*. Mr. Hervey is highly eſteemed by all the diſciples of that ſchool, has been complimented with the title of *Seraphic*, and flattered in dedications on the ſcore of theſe dialogues; they are recommended to all, are in the hands of all; and as there is a neceſſity for referring to ſome writer by way of authority for a genuine repreſentation of this doctrine, to whom can we refer ſo properly as to Mr. Hervey?—We refer (for the moſt part) to an edition in ſmall octavo, called the third edition, printed at London, 1755. The edition printed at Edinburgh, 1775, has ſome variations and remarkable additions. When we refer to this we ſhall note it.

Would men be content with the plain and poſitive declarations of ſcripture, there would (on this ſubject) be an end of controverſy. We are told in innumerable places, "*that we have redemption through the blood of Chriſt, even the forgiveneſs of ſins.* That *there is now no condemnation to them which are in Chriſt Jeſus, who walk not after the fleſh, but after the ſpirit.*"—But no!—We muſt not reſt here.—We are told, "God's attribute of ju-"ſtice muſt be preſerved inviolate, and inviolate it "is preſerved, if this doctrine of *penal* ſatisfacti-"on be admitted, (not elſe); nothing elſe can clear this

"this evangelical paradox JUST, and THE JUSTI-"FIER OF THE UNGODLY *.

Are then all evangelical paradoxes to be cleared up to our ſatisfaction? Are there to be no myſteries in religion? What are we to do with the doctrines of providence and of grace? for they have their difficulties. Are all God's attributes to be *thus* preſerved inviolate, and cleared of all *ſeeming* contrarieties—his immutability, yet moved by prayer—his foreknowledge, that cannot err—his decrees from eternity—yet man accountable?—No: but we expect to be ſatisfied about God's juſtice, or how ſhall we believe in it? —And cannot you believe in the wiſdom of God, unleſs you are acquainted with the grounds of every diſpenſation, and are ſatisfied that it was wiſely ordered? And do you demand this ſatisfaction not only with reſpect to God's diſpenſations on earth, but his diſpenſations in heaven too?—Why then cannot you believe the judge of all the earth will do right whether or no you ſee it particularly now? Did God intend you ſhould always ſee the juſtice of His proceedings in the ordinary adminiſtration of his government? Has God qualified you for it? Do you know the thoughts of other men? For on this the moral

* H. Dialogue iv. page 141, Lond. edit. See alſo Theological Miſcellany, vol. 2, p. 35, publiſhed by Mr. De Coetlogon.

quality of their actions, their merit or demerit depends. Can you proportion the degree or aſſign the ſort of puniſhment which juſtice requires, and which it is proper God ſhould appoint for different offenders? If you are utterly unqualified to underſtand or decide upon ſuch points reſpecting this world, why do you expect God ſhould acquaint you in what way his juſtice was ſatisfied in the great work of redemption, which may reſpect, and probably does reſpect an immenſe unknown part of His government *? Why tell us his juſtice muſt be preſerved inviolate to our apprehenſions?

But God *has* acquainted us in his word in what way his juſtice was ſatisfied.

When the ſcheme of redemption was completed, the Apoſtles were commiſſioned to publiſh it to the world; not in dark hints and figurative language, but plainly and literally. (I. Cor. ii.) Here then, if any where, we may look for a full explanation of this myſtery. Their firſt public preaching was to the Jews, for ſo they were commanded. And what ſays Peter on this occaſion? *Him being delivered by the determinate council and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wick-*

* Chriſtianity is a particular ſcheme under a GENERAL PLAN OF PROVIDENCE; and a part of that plan conducive to its completion, as far as regards mankind. Butler's Analogy, p. 272.

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ed hands have crucified and ſlain.—The Jews were not ignorant of the true God and his attributes; for to them were the oracles of God committed. Had it ſeemed good to the Holy Ghoſt to have given a more particular account of this *council of God*, the Jews were as well qualified to underſtand it as any now are. So again, the whole aſſembly of the Apoſtles ſay in their prayer to God, "*that Herod and Pontius Pilate and the people of* "*Iſrael were gathered together to do* whatſoever thy hand and thy council *determined before to do.*" The Apoſtles ſpeak largely of the love and mercy of God in the work of redemption;—that *he ſent his ſon into the world, that the world through him might be ſaved.* They ſpeak alſo of the *depth of the riches both of the* WISDOM AND KNOWLEDGE *of God*, but not one word of the divine juſtice. On the contrary Paul ſays, *how unſearchable are His judgments*, (that is His juſtice) *and his ways paſt finding out!*

One paſſage indeed is much inſiſted upon; as proving that the ſacrifice of Chriſt was meant for a *preſent* diſplay of the juſtice of God.—Rom. iii. 23—26. See Hervey, page 141.

Here let it be obſerved, that by *juſt* or being *juſt* is very ſeldom meant duly executing diſtributive juſtice, very frequently being holy *. "More

* In ſcripture, *judgment* is often put for the due executing of diſtributive juſtice, and ſometimes for doing commutative juſtice.

"than ninety and nine *juſt* perſons that need no re-"pentance."—So Chriſt died, the *juſt* for the *unjuſt*; that is, he who was perfectly holy died for unholy ſinners *.

Analogous to this ſenſe, *to juſtify* means to treat another as if he were holy, and then the ſenſe of this famous paſſage will be—That God in appointing ſuch a ſacrifice, in accepting of nothing leſs as a propitiation for ſin than the precious blood of his ſon, hereby manifeſted his holy nature; ſhewing that he might be—*juſt, and the juſtifier of him which believed in Jeſus.*—That is, ſhowing that he might be *holy*, though he received (believing) ſinners into his favour—though he treated ſinners of a particular deſcription (not all) as if they were holy †.

If

* Unjuſt, when applied to all mankind, can only mean unholy, a race of ſinners. Therefore juſt, as here oppoſed to unjuſt, can only mean holy.

The places in ſcripture are innumerable, where (ſpeaking of men) *juſt* means *holy*, and ſometimes alſo *merciful*. Mat. i. 19. And in ſpeaking of God, in moſt places it may with more propriety be ſo underſtood than otherwiſe. So Iſai. xlv. 21, I the Lord, a *juſt* God and a Saviour.

† Dodderidge gives both ſenſes of this paſſage. "It is "equally wonderful *(firſt)* that an holy God ſhould juſtify "unholy ſinners, as that *(ſecondly)* a juſt God ſhould for-"bear to puniſh the violators of his laws." Either may be the ſenſe of the paſſage conſiſtently with all Dodderidge's obſervations.

The

If we take the other ſenſe, then righteouſneſs muſt ſtand for the due execution of diſtributive juſtice, which it ſeldom does. The ſenſe will then be—God gave an eminent example of the due execution of diſtributive juſtice, by puniſhing all thoſe ſinners he receives into his favour, in the perſon of their *ſubſtitute* his Son.

It may be aſked, how does the ſacrifice of Chriſt ſhow the holineſs of God? Thoſe who hold it ſhows the juſtice, ſurely hold alſo that it ſhows the holineſs of God; therefore cannot move this queſtion by way of objection. But indeed this has been done. The whole progreſs of this work of redemption, moſt extraordinary in its manner, and moſt aſtoniſhing in its magnitude, ſhows that ſin is no light matter, when its conſequences are with ſuch difficulty removed. Such is the holy nature of God, ſuch the heinous nature of ſin, that nothing leſs than the blood of Chriſt could atone for it *.

But

The former cannot be without a propitiation for our ſins, nor the latter without an atonement to God's juſtice. The ſacrifice of Chriſt was both. Yet in what way this ſacrifice vindicates God's holineſs we may ſee; in what way it vindicates his juſtice, (I apprehend) in our preſent ſtate, we cannot ſee; and therefore it was not meant for a *preſent* diſplay of God's juſtice, but of his holineſs and mercy.

* If God hateth ſin ſo much that he would allow neither man nor angel for the redemption thereof, but only the death

But to return to our ſubject. The whole of this ſcheme of penal ſatisfaction is to explain in what way divine juſtice and mercy can be reconciled *. We have conſidered the general queſtion before. If Juſtice and her clamorous advocates are not ſatisfied on this occaſion, they muſt be ſilenced. We ought to acquieſce in God's diſpenſations, and believe that his juſtice is ſatisfied whenever he is pleaſed to extend mercy to ſinners. And ſurely we ſhould thankfully accept ſalvation by the lamb that was ſlain, though we are not made to ſee (at preſent) in what way it is that his blood (and his alone) cleanſeth us from all ſin.

What has been ſaid is to ſhow that we have no reaſon from the conſtitution of our nature, or the declarations of ſcripture to ſuppoſe it is the

death of his only and well-beloved ſon, who will not ſtand in fear thereof? *Homily on Good Friday.*

The value of the purchaſe may be ſeen in the greatneſs of the price. The evil of ſin in the worth of the propitiation.—*Witherſpoon* on Juſtification, p. 26.

The method of our redemption, taken in its whole extent, hath, in many ways, a tendency to vindicate the authority of God's laws, and deter his creatures from ſin, without conſidering the ſufferings of Chriſt as one example of God's impartial vengeance againſt ſin. See Dodderidge's Lect. p. 419.

* See Hervey, p. 141, Lond. edit. Butler's Analogy, part ii. chap. v. at the end.

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will of God *now* to inform us in what way his juſtice was ſatisfied by the ſacrifice of Chriſt.

We are now to ſhow—That vicarious puniſhment cannot ſatisfy diſtributive juſtice, according to the known laws and purpoſes of juſtice.—Suppoſing it was conſiſtent with diſtributive juſtice, yet vicarious puniſhment (as here laid down) is impoſſible, unſcriptural, and inadequate to the end propoſed.

Impoſſible; becauſe vicarious puniſhment, as here laid down, requires a transfer of moral character, here called "an imputation of guilt."

Unſcriptural; becauſe Chriſt did not ſuffer in a ſtate of guilt, neither reſpecting the inward feelings of his own mind, nor reſpecting his father's diſpoſition towards him.

Inadequate; becauſe the attempt to ſhow either an equality or an equipollency (in point of *penal ſatisfaction*) between the ſufferings of Chriſt in the human nature, and the ſufferings due to ſinners hereafter, *à priori* (or from the nature and degree of thoſe ſufferings) is abſurd and impoſſible.

The primary law of diſtributive juſtice is, that puniſhment muſt be diſpenſed according to moral deſert (See Eſſay II.) that is plainly according to the moral deſert of him that is puniſhed. To ſuppoſe that one man may ſin and another be puniſhed for thoſe ſins, is to ſuppoſe that one man

man may *deſerve* that another ſhould be *puniſhed*; than *which* nothing can be more abſurd.

This ſeems to be allowed; but we are told "that Chriſt ſubmits himſelf to the obligation of "ſinners;" that Chriſt takes the obligation upon himſelf. H. 67. Others tell us that the obligation of ſinners was transferred to Chriſt *.

The obligation of a magiſtrate to puniſh thoſe who violate the law is intelligible; it ariſes from his office, and is his duty. This when transferred to the ſupreme magiſtrate of the world, conſtitutes part of his moral character; his attribute of juſtice. If he has all power, ſinners *muſt* en-

* All this is taken from Grotius. L. ii. C. xx. S. 2. *Qui deliquit ſua voluntate videtur obligaſſe pœnæ—ita ut qui directe vult peccare per conſequentiam & poenam mereti voluerit.* And again. *Qui punit ut rectè puniat, jus habere debet ad puniendum, quod jus ex delicto nocentis naſcitur.*—That is, he who commits ſin, by that act tacitly conſents to be puniſhed, or lays himſelf under an obligation to ſuffer puniſhment; and the right of the judge to puniſh ariſes from that conſent.

Were all this true, it does not infer a power either in the judge or criminal to transfer this obligation to puniſhment to another. But all this is abſurd when applied to divine juſtice. Maxims reſpecting human governments, where all are originally equal, and where authority is founded on conſent, are here transferred to the ſupreme being and his creatures, where originally there is the greateſt difference poſſible, and where authority is founded on nature, not conſent.

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dure the puniſhment; they cannot help it. What means then their obligation to endure it? Is it their duty to be puniſhed? For obligation implies duty. If you will talk of obligation, it muſt be the obligation of a righteous God to puniſh ſinners. This may be made void through Chriſt—not transferred.

But mean what it will, it means an obligation upon ſinners of a moral nature. Now moral obligation is perſonal; it ariſes from perſonal circumſtances, and cannot be transferred. Every man is under an obligation to be thankful to God, to worſhip God. Can this obligation be tranſferred? can another be thankful to God or worſhip God for him, and the man be diſcharged from all obligation either to gratitude or worſhip? Surely one man cannot perform the duty of another; that is, what that other ought to perform for himſelf. Neither can it be ſuppoſed, without the utmoſt confuſion of ideas, that one man ſhould *deſerve* puniſhment, and another be obliged to undergo it who never deſerved any*. We hear nothing about this obligation of ſinners, or the transfer of obligation in ſcripture.

But we are told Chriſt becomes RESPONSIBLE for the guilt of his people, page 67.—Plainly in alluſion to a ſurety who becomes *reſponſible* for the debt of another.

* Mr. Balguy on Redemption, p. 15, republiſhed by Dr. Balguy, 1785.

All

All this is built intirely on the unſcriptural application of the ſcripture metaphor of debts; a metaphor repreſenting ſometimes the duties we *owe* to God; ſometimes treſpaſſes for which we are *accountable*; ſometimes puniſhment which is ſaid to be *due* either to the governor, or to the law, or to juſtice. We ſay unſcriptural application; for this metaphor is never employed in ſcripture to explain or repreſent to us the method of redemption.—It is employed wholly to inculcate the doctrine of mutual forgiveneſs between man and man, eſpecially in the parable in Mat. xviii. But though we are there taught that our Lord may *forgive* us our debts, and that we ought to *forgive* our fellow-ſervants; yet nothing is ſaid or intimated about a *transfer* of the debt (of puniſhment) from us to any other *. Debts of property are beneficial to the creditor; the benefit to the creditor accompanies the transfer of the debt: and

* In criminal caſes the ſentence of the law neither is nor can be transferred from the guilty perſon to another, either by the authority of the judge or the will of the criminal; and yet we ſpeak of puniſhment as a *debt* due to juſtice.

Grotius is undoubtedly right—that commutative juſtice has nothing to do with puniſhments. As to what Gronovius ſays, that the criminal is not conſidered as one to whom puniſhment is due or owing, but who himſelf owes puniſhment to law and government; it is trifling about a metaphor ſometimes uſed in one way and ſometimes in the other. L. ii. C. xx. S. 2. Par. 2.

were

were the ſufferings of any one either beneficial or pleaſing to God, it might be the ſame to him who ever paid this debt of ſuffering; and a commutation of perſons, with a tranſlation of puniſhment (as Hervey ſays, p. 130) might take place, provided there be an equality of puniſhment, which is abſolutely neceſſary on the principles of commutative juſtice, here ſhuffled by legerdemain into the place of diſtributive juſtice.

It is on this ſimile of a debt, that very much of what Hervey and others ſay on this ſubject depends. So H. ſays. "Chriſt paid a debt of cōn-"ſummate obedience."—Put it to the account of the Redeemer, he will repay it. He has given bond. (p. 43, Edinb. edit.)—The debt of penal ſuffering, and debt of perfect obedience, are fully diſcharged by our divine ſurety, ſo that we are no longer under a neceſſity of obeying to obtain an exemption from puniſhment, (page 208). —Again.—"*God is faithful and juſt to forgive us* "*our ſins.* I. John i. 9.—*Faithful*, becauſe he had "promiſed this bleſſing by the unanimous voice "of all his prophets.—*Juſt!* Surely then he will "*puniſh!* No; for this very reaſon he will *par-*"*don.*—This may ſeem ſtrange; but upon the "EVANGELICAL PRINCIPLES of atonement and re-"demption, it is apparently true; becauſe when "the debt is paid, or the purchaſe made, it is "the

" the part of *equity* to cancel the bond, and con-
" ſign over the purchaſed poſſeſſion *." H. 168.

This hackneyed ſimile of a debt equally ſerves the pious Hervey and the infidel Tyndall.—" If " (ſays Tyndall) God be a merciful and benign " being, he will accept the payment we are able " to make, and not inſiſt on impoſſible demands, " with his bankrupt creatures. It cannot be wiſ-" dom nor juſtice in God to afflict his creatures " unneceſſarily; and unneceſſary it is in the next " world, for they cannot make payment, unleſs " they might live their life over again. He will " undoubtedly paſs an act of grace, as they can

* Never was a plain paſſage ſo miſapplied! The words and ſenſe are, *If we confeſs our ſins* (and repent according to the covenant of grace) *God is faithful and juſt* (to the terms of that covenant) *to forgive us our ſins, and* (alſo as He has promiſed) *to cleanſe us from all unrighteouſneſs.*

What has punitive juſtice to do with confeſſion and ſanctification? JUST here plainly refers to the juſtice of contracts, to the new covenant.——Two or three words are here taken out of the middle of a text; what goes before, and what follows, is kept out of ſight.

Hawes gives the ſame interpretation: In quoting the text he ſubſtitutes the word *righteous* for *faithful*. Hawes on the Sacrament, p. 13.

Men may make a fuſs about reading the bible, and tell us how themſelves have not only read it over, but *prayed* it over *chapter by chapter*; yet if they read with party prejudice, the plaineſt paſſage will be miſunderſtood. See Scott's Force of Truth, pages 164 and 198.

" make

" make no ſatisfaction for debts unhappily con-
" tracted in their life time."

So alſo the author of the *Triumph of Truth.*—
" If a perſon owe me a ſum of money, and I
" chuſe to have the whole debt diſcharged, is it
" not the ſame thing, whether I remit the debt at
" once, or ſupply him with money wherewith to
" pay me?"

We have endeavoured to ſhow that vicarious puniſhment cannot ſatisfy the known laws of diſtributive juſtice; and to obviate two arguments to ſhow that it can; one, that the *obligation* to puniſhment may be transferred; the other, that puniſhment being a *debt*, another may make himſelf reſponſible.

We come now to conſider how far this ſubſtitution anſwers the known ends of puniſhment.

Theſe are reckoned—The deterring either the perſon puniſhed or others from tranſgreſſing the laws—vindicating the honour of God—ſatisfying the law, or magnifying the law.

As to the ends of puniſhment firſt mentioned, ſubſtituting the innocent for the guilty, anſwers none of them. Not the reformation of him who ſuffers; he wants none. Not the deterring others. For what reſtraint is it to a wicked man, to be told his wickedneſs will bring ſufferings on another for whom he has no affection? Nor will he

be afraid of that juſtice which puniſhes not the ſinner himſelf but another in his ſtead.

In human governments no one thinks of ſuch an abſurdity; and there the deterring offenders is the only end of puniſhment. One caſe may be thought to favour vicarious puniſhments. It is the caſe of Treaſon, where children are deprived of hereditary eſtates and honours for the crimes of their parents. But the puniſhment is intended for the parents. Their love for their own offſpring, the uneaſineſs which the apprehenſion of ſuch a loſs to their children may create, it is thought will be a powerful reſtraint upon the parent. And the ſtate may judge it neceſſary to take away hereditary wealth and power from thoſe who, through the prejudice of education, would probably employ them to overturn the conſtitution.

There is another argument of this kind which cannot be better ſtated than in Hervey's own words: "If the Lord ſpared not his own ſon "when ſin was not committed by him, but only "imputed to him, how much leſs ſhall he ſpare "incorrigible offenders who both habitually com-"mit, and obſtinately perſiſt in their daring im-"pieties?" Page 164, Lond. or p. 132, Edinb. edition.

The conſequence here drawn is juſt, and the argument very obvious, allowing this doctrine of

ſin

ſin imputed to Chriſt—but nothing like this argument appears any where in ſcripture. The ſufferings of Chriſt are no where repreſented as an example of God's vindictive or punitive juſtice.

One text indeed is quoted by many. Rom. viii. 32. "He that *ſpared* not his ſon, but deli-"vered him up for us all, how ſhall he not with "him alſo freely give us all things?"

Becauſe the word *ſpare* is found in the text, it is applied as meaning to ſpare from puniſhment, *as when a man ſpareth his ſon.* The context obliges us to put on it the very oppoſite ſenſe to the not withholding correction — the not withholding what was a kindneſs and benefit to men, though it was ſo dear and precious to God. The purport is to ſhow that God giveth liberally to believers—not to ſhow his ſeverity to ſinners. This abſurd interpretation is not in Hervey, though others are fond of it *.

The vindication of the honour of God is another end which this ſcheme of vicarious puniſhment is ſaid to anſwer. I fear we do not well know what we are about when we thus undertake to vindicate the honour of God. Unſcriptural vindications are more likely to diſgrace than ſerve the cauſe. Like Uzzah, you fancy the ark of God is falling, and put forth the prophane

* Theological Miſcel. vol. 2, page 35.

hand of human ſyſtem to ſupport it. In due time God will ariſe and will plead his own cauſe; wait then for the great day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God.

According to our conceptions, God's honour is then vindicated when he takes ſignal vengeance on his enemies. God ſays, *I will be honoured upon Pharaoh and upon all his hoſt.*—And how? This great hoſt was overthrown in a moment, and thus he *triumphed glorioufly* by the overthrow of the Egyptians in the Red Sea—not of the Iſraelites in their ſtead.

Satisfying the law is another end ſaid to be anſwered by vicarious puniſhments.

The law is then, and then only ſatisfied, when its threatenings are literally and fully executed. But ſinners are threatened in their own perſons, not in the perſon of a ſubſtitute. Nor is the law honoured by the vicarious obedience of an unauthorized deputy.—Not authorized by thoſe whom he repreſents. The law is then honoured when its commands are obeyed by THOSE who are enjoined obedience: it is honoured when its authority prevails, and oppoſers are puniſhed.—But Chriſt was not an oppoſer. The ſufferings of Chriſt, in obedience to the will of the Father, may be juſtly conſidered as honouring the Father. Pſ. XL. His perfect obedience to the moral law, may be conſidered as honouring the moral law.

In

In both caſes, God and his law are honoured by the perſonal obedience of Chriſt, not as the deputy of others. The perſonal obedience of Chriſt is repreſented as making many righteous, in the very ſame ſenſe as the perſonal diſobedience of Adam made many ſinners: by its conſequences.

There is another curious ſcheme by which ſome think the law may be honoured; namely, that ſin *in the abſtract* may be puniſhed; that is, the ſin itſelf may be puniſhed, and ſo the ſinner ſuffer nothing. Thus Hervey, "Though God par-" dons ſin, (meaning the ſinner) yet IT (mean-" ing the ſin) ſhall not go unpuniſhed." H. 147 *.

Sin denotes a quality of an action; but an action cannot exiſt without an actor, nor ſin where there is no ſinner. The notion of *ſin*, as ſomething ſeparate from, and what may exiſt without a ſinner, takes its riſe from the poets, who perſonify ſin, death, &c. When we ſay ſin deſerves puniſhment, it is the ſinner that is meant. Nothing is capable of deſerving but what is capable of acting. Deſert, whether good or bad, can be predicated only of moral agents. The ſinner, *He*

* We have commented on Hervey's words, for literally they are a flat contradiction.

Watts alſo ſpeaks in this manner, impersonally as the grammarians call it, when he talks of the juſtice and wiſdom in contriving that ſin ſhall be puniſhed, yet the ſinner be ſpared. See Watts's Redeemer, &c. p. 27 and 74.—Indeed for the moſt part Watts agrees intirely with Hervey.

who commits the ſin, it is, who is the object of God's wrath, and who alone can be the ſubject of puniſhment. It would be ſtrange indeed if the *felony* could ſuffer the law and be hanged, while the *felon* ſhould eſcape unhurt.

Not much unlike this is that abſurd, but very common way of ſpeaking of abſtract or general ideas, as having a particular and real exiſtence. So Hervey, "MAN being ruined none could re-"cover HIM but his maker; but ſhall HE be re-"ſtored without HIS ſuffering the puniſhment due "to HIS crime and threatened by his maker?" "H. 67. That is, ſhall the man (Adam and his ſons, ſinners) be reſtored without *his* (the man Chriſt Jeſus, no ſinner) ſuffering the puniſhment due to *his* (Adam's) crime, and threatened to him (Adam and his ſons)—not to (him) Chriſt Jeſus.

After all, the man Adam and his ſons was reſtored without his (the man Adam and his ſons) ſuffering the puniſhment due to their ſins. What elſe is redemption?

It is now time to conſider how far this ſcheme is warranted by ſcripture. We have before ſhown that the general declarations of ſcripture give us no ground to expect we ſhould now be informed how God's juſtice was ſatisfied, yet there may be particular paſſages at leaſt countenancing this ſcheme of vicarious puniſhment.

The

The chief argument for this is, that the ſcripture calls Chriſt our *ſurety*, or as they expound it, man's ſubſtitute. So Hervey, "God will cer-"tainly inflict his righteous vengeance, and ex-"ercise his punitive juſtice, though not on the "ſinner whom he ſpares, yet on the *ſurety* whom "he has provided." H. 147. Again. "Chriſt "was our *ſubſtitute*." H. 182. And in page 200, H. ſays, "Jeſus is in the ſacred writings expreſsly "ſtiled A SURETY *."

Here is an inſtance of a ſingle word occurring once only in the new teſtament, ſeparated from the context, and by that means a falſe repreſentation of the text is given!—Chriſt is NOT ſtiled *ſimply* A SURETY, nor *man's ſurety*, nor *man's ſubſtitute*, but A SURETY OF A TESTAMENT; or as Dr. Doddridge properly tranſlates it, the SURETY OF A COVENANT †.

* The notion of a ſurety implies a contract of ſome ſort between two parties, and therefore takes place in commutative juſtice *only*. Diſtributive juſtice makes no contract, but denounces puniſhment on the offender.—Hervey (in page 200) pretends to reconcile vicarious ſatisfaction to diſtributive juſtice—yet takes up the ſcheme of a ſurety. Says, if the payment of the ſurety be as ſatisfactory to the creditor, as the payment of the debtor, why not the puniſhment of the innocent as ſatisfactory to God as the puniſhment of the guilty? Aſks, why that ſhould be exploded in divinity which is admitted in our courts of juſtice?—In civil cauſes of property it may; but in criminal cauſes no ſubſtitution is ever admitted. What confuſion of commutative and diſtributive juſtice!

† Hervey ſo tranſlates the word διαθήκη, page 163.

The text is, Heb. vii. 22. "By ſo much was "Jeſus made a *ſurety* of a better teſtament."—This and the foregoing verſes Dr. Dodderidge paraphraſes thus:

"Chriſt being made a prieſt by an oath, by "ſo much dignity as ſuch an introduction adds "to his office, does it not appear that Jeſus "is preferable to Aaron and his ſons? Whence "it is natural to infer, that he is the *ſurety* of "a better covenant: or that the covenant of which "he is the great GUARANTEE *between God and man*, "is more excellent than that of which Aaron and "his ſons might be ſaid to be ſureties, in refe-"rence to certain acts which they were to perform "on the part of the people to God, and in the "name of God to the people."—*Family Expoſitor.*

A covenant is an agreement between two parties where conditions are ſtipulated on both ſides. It differs from a promiſe, (or as Hervey would call it, a bond). Here alſo are two parties; but the obligation is wholly on one ſide; the other ſide is bound to nothing. So in the old covenant, the parties were God, and man in the perſon of Adam. The condition on the part of Adam was perfect obedience; on the part of God immortality to Adam and his poſterity in paradiſe. In the new covenant the parties are alſo God and man. The conditions on the part of man;—repentance towards God, and faith towards our Lord

Lord Jeſus Chriſt. The conditions on the part of God—remiſſion of ſins and eternal life. The *ſurety*, or *guarantee*, is a perſon who makes it ſure to one of the parties that the other will perform the conditions, and on failure engages to perform the conditions himſelf. In a promiſe or bond the ſurety muſt be the ſurety of him that is bound; the other wants none. But in a covenant, the ſurety may be the ſurety of either party; for each party ſtipulates ſomewhat. Now is Jeſus, think you, the ſurety on the part of man to engage that man ſhall repent and believe, or otherwiſe to repent and believe for him? Or is he the ſurety on the part of God to *aſſure* penitent and believing ſinners that God will pardon them, and grant them eternal life? or otherwiſe he will beſtow both on them himſelf,—having purchaſed both for them: and all power being given unto him in heaven and in earth, he is therefore the proper *ſurety* and *guarantee* of the new covenant—not the *ſurety* or ſubſtitute of man.—What gave occaſion to this notion was the old ſimile of puniſhment being a debt upon bond.—We have been the more particular, becauſe this text is ſo much inſiſted upon. Chriſt the SURETY and ſubſtitute of man, is in every page of theſe authors; though in the apoſtolic writings the word occurs only once; the idea NEVER.

In

In Dial. iv. page 130, Lond. edit. Hervey ſays—" St. Paul affirms that Chriſt has delivered " us from the curſe of the law. How? By tak- " ing our place and enduring what we deſerved; " or, as the Apoſtle himſelf ſpeaks to the ſame " effect, but in a much more emphatical manner, " *by being made a curſe for us.* Does not this evi- " dently denote both a commutation of perſons, " and a tranſlation of puniſhment?" &c. *

The text is, Gal. iii. 13. *Chriſt hath redeemed us from the curſe of the law, being made a curſe for us: for it is writtten, curſed is every one that hangeth on a tree.*

The word *curſe* twice occurs in the former part of the verſe; but it cannot poſſibly be taken in the ſame ſenſe in both places. The curſe from which Chriſt hath redeemed us, is the curſe of dying an eternal death; but Chriſt was not made a curſe in this ſenſe: He did not die an eternal death. The curſe of the law, or rather the curſe written in the law, to which Chriſt ſubmitted; was the curſe of dying the death of a malefactor, and ſo Paul explains it. For, ſays he, it is written, *curſed is every one that hangeth on a tree.* The ſenſe of the paſſage is plainly this: Chriſt redeemed us

* Hervey, ſpeaking of Chriſt as a victim, ſays, " the " whole curſe of the law was exhauſted," p. 168.—Upon Chriſt, to make ſenſe of it. I. Cor. xii. 3. *No man ſpeaking by the ſpirit of God calleth Jeſus accurſed.*

from

from eternal death, by ſuffering on the croſs the death of a malefactor; called in the law an accurſed death.

Other texts are quoted; the following are the chief.

Awake, O ſword, againſt my ſhepherd, and againſt the man that is my fellow, ſaith the Lord of Hoſts; ſmite the ſhepherd, and the ſheep ſhall be ſcattered. Zech. xiii. 7.

This is highly figurative and prophetic of the ſufferings of Chriſt, and implies they were appointed of God. Hervey thus comments—"Does not this deſcribe the action of juſtice "turning the ſword from us and ſheathing it "in Chriſt?" H. 182.

A mere *Jeux de eſprit!*—One may ſay of ſuch writings, as Pope did of his own paſtorals, that "Pure deſcription holds the place of ſenſe."

Iſaiah liii. 6. Will be conſidered afterwards.

Iſaiah liii. 4. *He hath born our griefs.*

Iſaiah liii. 5 *He was wounded for our tranſgreſſions.*

I. Pet. iii. 18. *Chriſt alſo hath once ſuffered for ſins, the juſt for the unjuſt.*

I. Pet. ii. 24. *Who his own ſelf bore our ſins in his body on the tree.*

Theſe and innumerable other paſſages are deſcriptive of the ſufferings of Chriſt; ſome in general, others of his bodily ſufferings in particular,

lar, all of them affirming that the ſufferings of Chriſt on the croſs is the conſideration on which God forgives ſinners.—Affirming this in general terms: but not a word about the fitneſs, natural ſufficiency, penal value of this conſideration, implied in the notion of penal ſatisfaction.

Hervey, in a note on I. Pet. ii. 24, ſays, "it "was intended, one would imagine, to make the "article of our Lord's *vicarious ſufferings* clear be- "yond all miſapprehenſion, and ſure beyond all "doubt." H. 126.

When the ſufferings of one man are *in any way* the means of the *impunity* of another; it is uſual to ſay the former was *puniſhed* in the *ſtead* of the latter, though the former was innocent of the fault of the latter—and this is ſaid without meaning to aſſert a transfer of guilt, or any reference to diſtributive juſtice. So alſo when the ſufferings of one man is the means (in any way) by which another is diſcharged from ſuffering; we uſually call ſuch ſufferings VICARIOUS, eſpecially if the one ſubmits to theſe ſufferings *purpoſely* to procure the releaſe of the other; and this we do without meaning to affirm a mathematical equality or metaphyſical equipolency in the degree of ſuffering, and without meaning to ſpecify the mode in which theſe ſufferings have their efficacy.

In

In this place (page 126) Hervey means no more; and in this ſenſe there is no reaſon to object to the terms vicarious puniſhment, vicarious ſuffering, or even *Chriſt, man's ſubſtitute.* Let us not differ about words *.

We come now to the great point on which the notion of penal ſatisfaction depends, the doctrine of *imputation.* Hervey ſays, "it is the very fundamental article of the goſpel." And again, "What our Lord ſays with regard to the love "of God and the love of our neighbour,—on "theſe two commandments hang all the law and "the prophets:—much the ſame would I (James "Hervey) venture to ſay concerning the imputation of our ſins to Chriſt, and the impution of "Chriſt's righteouſneſs to us. On theſe two doctrines hang all the privileges and the whole glory "of the goſpel." H. 47, Lond. or 37, Edinb.

We propoſe to ſhow that ſuch an imputation of guilt as this (which is always ſo explained, as to imply a transfer of moral character), is impoſſible. That the ſcripture doctrine of imputation implies no ſuch transfer. That the diſtinction of two ſorts of guilt, *inherent* and *imputed,* is without foundation either in nature or in ſcripture. That ſcripture does not countenance this notion of a

* In this ſenſe *vicarious puniſhments* is uſed by Butler, p. 309.

tranſla-

tranſlation of the guilt of man to Chriſt, or that he ſuffered in a ſtate of guilt.

There are certain truths which every man feels in himſelf, and aſſents to ſo fully, that to go about to prove them would be ridiculous. That every man is HIMSELF no one doubts: when a man begins to queſtion this, you conſign him to Bedlam; and none but one of that fraternity would go about to prove that he is himſelf. It is the conſciouſneſs of a man's own actions, *as his own*, that is the foundation of all righteous government. *Every man is* THAT *only, and can be nothing elſe, which* HE IS IN HIMSELF *.

Innocence or guilt in every one's conſcience ariſes from a man's reflection upon his own actions, as being his own. What every man is thus in his own conſcience, *that* he is alſo in the ſight of God who ſees him as he is in himſelf, and whoſe diſpleaſure is againſt him who is *himſelf* guilty.

The actions of one man cannot be made to be the actions of another; ſo neither can the moral character of one man be made to be the mo-

* Mens cujuſque is eſt quiſque.

So ſays Theron, to which the Orthodox Aſpaſio replies; "If I had never ſeen the Bible, I ſhould have yielded my "ready aſſent to this propoſition; but when I open the old "teſtament, and ſee Iſaiah xlv: 25; when I turn to the new "teſtament, and find Col. ii. 20, I cannot concur with "Theron without CONTRADICTING REVELATION." H. 201.

ral

ral character of another.——But to this it is replied—God can do all things.—True; but God cannot work contradictions—contradictions are nullities—and a contradiction it is to make a man's own actions to be the actions of another: that is, to be his own, and alſo not his own at the ſame time.

Well then, it is ſaid, but what means the righteouſneſs of Chriſt ſo often ſaid in ſcripture to be IMPUTED to ſinners?

God, whoſe attribute is mercy, may upon ſuch grounds, and upon ſuch conditions as he thinks fit, pardon penitent ſinners; may admit pardoned ſinners into his favour; may admit them to a nearneſs to himſelf, treating them as ſons by adoption, allowing them acceſs to him in prayer, permitting them to cry, *Abba, Father*. In one word, he may treat them *as if they were righteous*, as if they were *juſt* perſons. And if this mercy and theſe privileges are granted to ſinners (not on their own account, but) on account of the righteouſneſs of Chriſt manifeſted in his active and paſſive obedience (as it is called), then the righteouſneſs of Chriſt may (by an eaſy and ſignificant figure of ſpeech) be ſaid to be IMPUTED to ſinners, without any tranſfer of the perſonal character of Chriſt to ſinners. They are dealt with, as if they were perfectly righteous, as Chriſt actually was in the human nature.

nature. Such alſo are ſaid to be *juſtified*; to be accepted with God; to ſtand in the favour and eſtimation of God, as if they were *juſt* or *holy* perſons; though undoubtedly yet ſinners, and therefore not poſſeſſed of the moral character of Chriſt.

Nor does juſtification *of itſelf* make any alteration in the moral character of ſinners *. An alteration is undoubtedly made. Whom he juſtifies, thoſe he ſanctifies; and ſanctification is obtained by prayer; the prayer of thoſe whom God will hear: it follows juſtification. But ſanctification is not an inſtantaneous transfer of the moral character of another, but a real progreſſive alteration in the ſinner's own perſonal character. Juſtification is an act of God. Sanctification the operation of the holy ſpirit. The former imports God's diſpoſition towards man; the latter man's diſpoſition towards God.

In perfect analogy to this, and in no other ſenſe, may the ſin of man be ſaid to be imputed to Chriſt.

The imputation of Chriſt's righteouſneſs to a ſinner, does not make him innocent, neither does

* Juſtification follows faith, does not create it. Faith is the gift, the grace of God. Eph. ii. 8. Acts xviii. 27. It is the ſcripture ſenſe of imputation, not the ſcripture doctrine of juſtification, that we have to do with; yet it is hardly poſſible to ſettle the one, without touching on the other.

the sin of man imputed to Christ (if you will hold that language) make Christ guilty *.

In point of suffering in his body on the cross, and in his mind from the powers of darkness, Christ was treated like a sinner. And he suffered to procure for men a deliverance from that punishment which *their* iniquities would otherwise have drawn down upon them. These sufferings

* These writers (Hervey, &c.) maintain the doctrine of "the sin of man imputed to Christ," in the first and chief place—so imputed, that Christ becomes personally guilty of the sins of believers, and an object of God's wrath;—which is proved not so much from scripture, as its necessity for our redemption. And the doctrine of "Christ's "righteousness imputed to man" is both expounded and proved by this doctrine of a personal imputation of sin to Christ. So Hervey (from Staynoe)—"Unless sin was im-"puted to Christ, he could not *truly* suffer in our stead, "nor be *justly* punished at all. And imputation is as rea-"sonable and justifiable in *one case* as in *the other*; for they "both stand upon one and the same foot; and for that rea-"son, he who throws down one, throws down both." Page 182, Lond. edit.

These two doctrines do not stand on one and the same foot in scripture; the expression, "The sin of man im-"puted to Christ," is not in scripture, but God is said "to impute righteousness to man," Rom. iv. 6, 11. It is of importance to know how sinners may be justified before God; but not—to know how God may be justified (to our apprehensions) in forgiving sinners through Christ.

See also page 198, Lond. Edit. where it is said, "Christ "possesses the *essence* of imputed righteousness; as our cove-"nant head," &c. See also page 202.

of Chriſt, this mode of deliverance, was alſo appointed of God. It may therefore be ſaid in a figurative yet common form of ſpeech (putting the cauſe for the effect) "that the Lord laid on *him* "the iniquities of us all;"—without an imputation or transfer of our guilt to the perſon of Chriſt, or ſuppoſing him guilty of our tranſgreſſions in the ſight of God.

Other texts are quoted to ſhow that Chriſt was a ſinner in ſome ſenſe or other. So II. Cor. v. 21, "He made him to be ſin who knew no ſin."—To be ſin in the *abſtract*—not a ſinner. All interpreters agree it means an offering for ſin. So the ſecond Homily on the paſſion, "God made him "a ſacrifice for our ſins, which knew not ſin."

Again, Heb. ix. 28. "He ſhall appear the ſe-"cond time without ſin unto ſalvation." Whence Hervey infers that he appeared the firſt time *with ſin*, not indeed committed by him, but imputed to him. H. 182.

Upon inferences like this the imputed guilt of Chriſt is maintained.—The plain ſenſe is—he ſhall appear a ſecond time in the human nature; but not in that nature in order to ſuffer for the ſins of his people as before, but now that he may complete their ſalvation: not as before, to be made a ſin-offering for the world, but to judge the world.

Though

Though in one ſenſe Chriſt ſuffered like a ſinner, though he was *numbered among the tranſgreſſors*, yet we maintain this great difference between his ſufferings and the puniſhment of ſinners. His ſufferings, whatever they were, he voluntarily took upon himſelf; they were not inflicted by a ſuperior power. In his own conſcience, and in his father's love and regard, he ſuffered nothing. When expiring on the croſs he was then in every ſenſe of the word innocent, and God beheld him as ſuch.

In theſe reſpects, as well as in the nature and duration of his ſufferings, he was not treated as if he had perpetrated the crimes of all believers, &c. as Hervey affirms, p. 133. It may be mercy to treat ſinners as righteous, but not juſtice to treat the innocent as guilty.

But this does not ſuit the ſcheme of ſatisfaction: this requires a tranſlation of the puniſhment of ſinners to Chriſt, and an exact equivalent both in kind and degree; nothing elſe (as they ſay) can ſatisfy the demands of juſtice. Now that the ſufferings of Chriſt may be properly puniſhments, may be what would have fallen on ſinners had juſtice been executed on them in perſon, may be with juſtice inflicted on Chriſt, it is neceſſary he ſhould be guilty, *really* guilty, (as Hervey ſays) and under the wrath of God:—but here is a difficulty—How can he be guilty

whoſe innocence is ſo often aſſerted in ſcripture?

The ſchool-men can always eſcape through a diſtinction. Guilt, they tell us, is of two ſorts, *culpable* and *penal*, as it was called in the laſt century; or *inherent* and *imputed*, as it is now called *.

It is difficult to confute a mere aſſertion; what has no foundation muſt fall of itſelf. What guilt is, every man will find by looking into himſelf; but he will never find there two ſorts of guilt; one ariſing from a reflection on his own actions, another from reflecting on the actions of other men. This diſtinction then has no foundation in nature. We ſhall now ſhow that it is not countenanced in ſcripture; that there is no mention made of a guilt transferrable, or transferred; that in the ſingular caſe of the ſufferings of Chriſt, the definition of a VICARIOUS guilt, is forged merely to ſerve a purpoſe.

Whatever this ſcheme of imputed guilt is, we muſt take it as they give it us. In page 197, H. ſays, "We never aſſert that the eſſence of

* See Clarkſon's Sermon on the Sacrifice of Chriſt, p. 917. David Clarkſon, B. D. was fellow of Clare Hall, Cambridge, and tutor to Tillotſon. His ſermons are printed in folio, 1696.

Juſt ſo the Papiſts defend Saint-Worſhip. Worſhip is of two ſorts, λατρεία and δουλεία; we abhor the paying the former to a ſaint; the latter is conſiſtent with the honour of God.

"Chriſt's righteouſneſs is TRANSFUSED into be-
"lievers. Chriſt's righteouſneſs is made OURS, not
"by infuſion but by imputation." This diſtinction we ſuppoſe is alſo to be applied to the eſſence of our guilt, made Chriſt's. However, we are told there was a TRANSLATION of the GUILT of the children of Iſrael into the SCAPE-GOAT. H. 53. The difference in theſe ſcholaſtic terms, a *tranſfuſion*, or a *tranſlation*, whether of righteouſneſs or of ſin, or of guilt, is very ſubtile indeed *.

This is the grand argument.—The ſin of thoſe who ſacrificed was transferred to the victim; and in the *ſame ſenſe* the ſin of man was transferred to Chriſt our paſſover, who was ſacrificed for us. —Surely in both caſes in a figurative ſenſe only. It was no more poſſible for Aaron literally to put or place all the tranſgreſſions of the people (their ſinful thoughts and words or even their deeds) upon the head of the goat, than for the goat to

* In the edition of 1775, at Edinburgh, is a remarkable note, the latter part of which we ſhall tranſcribe *verbatim*. "Whatever ſenſe men of learning and refinement "may FORCE upon theſe words (Lev. xvi. 21, 22), *Aaron* "*ſhall put all their tranſgreſſions upon the head of the goat,* "*and the goat ſhall bear upon him all their iniquities*—I "think the common people of Iſrael could find no other "meaning in them than ſuch as denoted a TRANSFERRING "of guilt from the congregation to the victim: AND THIS "IS IMPUTATION." Page 44.

Let no one think theſe laſt words are a ſneer; they are the very words of the book.

become guilty of all the ſins of all the people. It is a known rule of interpretation, when words are literally impoſſible, a figurative ſenſe muſt be put upon them. Our Lord ſays—THIS IS MY BODY—THIS IS MY BLOOD. No words more poſitive, no words more literal—yet you do not believe tranſubſtantiation.

Well! but though the terms, a transferring, or tranſlation of guilt is not in ſcripture, yet imputation of guilt is there. St. Paul deſires the guilt of Oneſimus might be imputed to *him*.—Hervey's words (page 53) are, "St. Paul ſpeaking of the "crimes which Oneſimus had committed, and the "injuries which Philemon had ſuſtained, ſays, "charge them all on me; in the original, *impute* "them all to me.—I will be reſponſible, as if "the whole *guilt* had been of my contracting.—"Here is the imputation, not of ſomething done "by the Apoſtle, but of another's criminal be-"haviour."

This is a ſtrange miſrepreſentation.—Not a word in the text of crimes, injuries, or criminal behaviour to be imputed to Paul.—The words are—*If he hath wronged thee* (plainly of temporal goods becauſe joined with debts) *or oweth thee ought, put* THAT *on my account—I will repay* IT:—namely, the debt or temporal damage done to Philemon—not repay the crimes, injuries, or criminal behaviour of Oneſimus!

We

We come now to the particular caſe of guilt imputed to Chriſt.

In page 133, Aſpaſio ſays, "If by guilt you "mean the conſciouſneſs of having committed ſin, "we never ſuppoſe ſuch a vicarious guilt in "Chriſt.

This is plainly the ſenſe of the word in all common language. But it is eaſy to invent ſcholaſtic terms and unintelligible definitions to darken the ſubject and ſerve a purpoſe. We are told——"Guilt is the CHARGE of a criminal ac- "tion, and the OBLIGATION to ſuffer."

A charge is a ſolemn accuſation. (Pſ. xxxv. 11.) (Acts xxiii. 29) It may be either true or falſe. And does a bare accuſation or charge conſtitute guilt? But waving all this: according to this definition, guilt is nothing internal or perſonal. It is a charge on one perſon made by another; who alſo impoſes upon the former a *moral* obligation to be puniſhed. Both this charge, and this obligation, are forcibly impoſed by another; they are not the act of him, nor ariſe from any act of him, who is called *guilty*. They make no part of his moral character, have no concern or connection with it, and therefore are no ground for juſt puniſhment, according to any idea we can form of diſtributive juſtice.

When we are told that Chriſt was thus charged, &c. it is a mere begging of the queſtion. Chriſt

being thus charged, is by virtue of this definition to be CALLED guilty—That his ſufferings may be SAID to be of a PENAL nature, and ſuch as COULD make PENAL SATISFACTION.

So Hervey ſays, "All our criminal actions were "*charged* upon Chriſt."—He ſuffered (not under a charge but) AS under a charge of ſin.

But though the guilt of Chriſt is only imputed, yet we are told it is *real* guilt.—It is the very guilt contracted by ſinners, which is undoubtedly real. By imputation it is transferred to Chriſt, it becomes the guilt of Chriſt. Hervey's words are, "real guilt contracted by one and imputed "to another;" p. 133 *. That is, the action one man's, its moral quality another's.—If this means any thing, it means a transfer of the moral character of ſinners to Chriſt. And agreeably to this,

* Nothing but real guilt, real demerit can be the juſt ground of puniſhment according to any rule of diſtributive juſtice known to us. None but thoſe who are really guilty are the objects of God's wrath, as far as his word teaches. A transfer of the guilt of ſinners (that is of their moral character) to Chriſt, is neceſſary to make him a proper ſubject of puniſhment; a juſt object of God's wrath. All which is here maintained—elſewhere denied.

Dr. Horne ſays,—"Our Lord took the guilt of ſinners "upon himſelf." Title to Pſ. 38.—Why not impart his innocence to them? one is juſt as poſſible as the other. We take the expreſſions of theſe writers in the literal ſenſe—they are ſo propoſed—not but that ſome may ſay, all this is figurative.

Chriſt

Chriſt being thus guilty, is ſaid to be "oppreſſed "with innumerable crimes, to have a painful "ſenſation of them, and plainly to become an "object of God's wrath." H. 153.

Here are EVANGELICAL PARADOXES enough—To ſolve one we create many.—Thus we find perfect innocence and real guilt united in Chriſt.—No conſciouſneſs of ſin, page 133, yet a painful ſenſation of it, page 153; or as it is expreſſed by another, "he was *oppreſſed* with innumerable and "abominable crimes."—He offered himſelf to God without ſpot and without blemiſh; yet at that very time God beheld in him a deluge of iniquities, p. 153.—Laſtly. He in whom God was well pleaſed was made the BUTT of his *infinite* indignation. Theological miſcellany, page 303*, vol. I.

But to return to Hervey, whoſe words we muſt now quote at length, page 134, Lond. page 108, Edinb. "*Theron.*—If ſin was really imputed to "Chriſt, and guilt is the reſult of ſuch imputa-"tion, then puniſhment was his due; juſtice "might inſiſt upon it—and he could not eſcape. "*Aſpaſio.* To ſuppoſe this is ſo far from being "ſhocking to my apprehenſion, that it appears "even on your own principles *right and neceſſary.* "Right, becauſe puniſhment, as you yourſelf have "declared, always connotes guilt; I would add,

* A picture *this*, of which theſe writers are very fond.—See Hervey, p. 124, Edinb.

"ariſing

" arising from crimes commmitted, or from crimes " imputed," p. 108, Edinb. edit. p. 134, Lond *.

The objection is, if Christ was guilty he was rightly punished. The answer is, he was rightly punished; (therefore he was guilty) for by our definition punishment connotes guilt.—This is plainly begging the question.—The answer is obscurely worded. It may mean—it is right that Christ should be punished, because guilt requires punishment—not " punishment implies guilt."

But what follows in Hervey is more material. " The sufferings of Christ could not be of a penal " nature, unless he endured them as under a " charge of guilt.—It is NECESSARY to suppose " this, otherwise how will you vindicate the ju- " stice of God ?"

Here we may see the source of all these vain explanations. Men form to themselves notions of what it becomes God to do, and then fancy, and would make scripture say, he acted accordingly.

* What means guilt arising from crimes imputed?

They who not only say that justice was satisfied by the sufferings of Christ, but will show it *(a priori)* from the laws of distributive justice, the ends of punishment, &c. must take all these terms as commonly understood, as they are used both by the writers on ethics and in scripture. If new and vague definitions are thus to be given to old and known terms (as here to the term guilt), you may in appearance prove any thing; while the whole in reality becomes a trifling contention of words.

Hence

Hence their proofs are neither taken from the word of God, nor the analogy of his works, but a fancied neceſſity and metaphyſical notions of their own. So here it is ſaid "it is NECESSARY "to ſuppoſe this, otherwiſe how will you vindicate "the juſtice of God?"—Again, page 153, "This "is UNAVOIDABLE with reſpect to the divine ho- "nour—That is NECESSARY for the procurement "of our redemption."

But let us ſee how the juſtice of God is impeached, and how it is defended by theſe divines.

"God (ſays Hervey, p. 134,) bids his ſword "awake and ſmite the bleſſed Jeſus; but ſhall "the judge of all the earth do wrong? Shall he "ſmite where there is nothing but innocence? "No guilt either perſonal or imputed? That be "far from him—the thought be far from us.— "Whereas upon this ſuppoſition it becomes a *juſt* "and *righteous* thing, that God ſhould inflict, and "that Chriſt ſhould ſuſtain the moſt rigorous pu- "niſhment."

And now what does this defence of God's juſtice amount to?—God by an act of his irreſiſtible power, makes Chriſt guilty of all the ſins of all believers in all ages, (page 153). Then beholding in him a deluge of iniquities, God's anger is kindled, (p. 153). He ſmites with the ſword of his vengeance (p. 167) for thoſe very ſins, of which he himſelf had made Chriſt to be guilty!

—and

—and this is called a juſt diſpleaſure in the deity! p. 136*.—*Non tali auxilio; nec defenſoribus iſtis*
Tempus eget!

It muſt be allowed that here Hervey is perfectly conſiſtent, for he thinks that "becauſe "Chriſt was guilty, therefore he was dumb. "Like a convicted criminal he opened not his "mouth." H. 135.—Peter was of another opinion when he propoſed Jeſus as an example of bearing unjuſt ſufferings patiently. If indeed he was buffeted for his faults, (in whatever way he became faulty) then, as Peter ſays, *what glory is it if he took it patiently?* I. Pet. ii. 20.

The ſufferings of Chriſt may be reconciled to the divine juſtice in the ſame way with the ſufferings of the martyrs. The martyrs indeed were not innocent, but their ſufferings were vaſtly diſproportionate to their moral character. Here, if any

* We have before noted the agreement between profeſſed infidels and the patrons of this ſcheme, in arguing from the ſimile of debts. Here is another inſtance. Both proceed on this principle—That the ſufferings of an innocent perſon can never be a reaſon for the pardon of the guilty—they cannot ſee HOW it ſhould——to be ſure they *cannot*. So one rejects the ſcripture-account of redemption, the other mends it. One concludes that the ſufferings of Chriſt are of no efficacy at all, the other that Chriſt muſt be firſt made guilty before they can be of any.—Without this, he is not the proper ſurety, not the real ſubſtitute of ſinners, nor qualified to ſtand in their LAW-PLACE, as they phraſe it.—*Force of Truth*, page 95.

where,

where, you must allow an unequal distribution and a defective justice. The sufferings of Christ, as a man, is only a stronger instance of the same sort of inequality. In both cases the sufferings are permitted, not inflicted; are for a time only, and in their consequences work out for the sufferer a far more exceeding weight of glory *. The worthies in the 11th chap. of the Hebrews had respect unto the recompense of the reward. And so had Christ. It was for the joy that was set before him that he endured the cross. Not wholly the joy of redeeming sinners, great as that undoubtedly was: for Jesus is here proposed, like the worthies, as an example to encourage Christians to endure unmerited sufferings patiently; and the encouragement held out equally to both, must be somewhat of the same kind, what we may call their personal reward. We are also told what this reward was in the case of Christ. Where-

* That sufferings are in most cases man's appointed road to benefit, is supported by the whole analogy of nature. He that is sick must patiently submit to be made more sick before he can be made well. Heb. ii. 10.

The world's being under the righteous government of God, does imply, that finally, and upon the whole, every one shall receive according to his personal deserts. And the general doctrine of the whole scripture is, that this shall be the completion of the divine government. But during the progress, vicarious punishments (sufferings) may be fit and necessary, &c. Butler, p. 309.

fore

fore God hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above every name. *Wherefore*,—that is becauſe being found in faſhion as a man he became obedient unto death, even the death of the croſs.—He ſuffered in the human nature, and in that nature hath God raiſed him from the dead, and ſet him at his own right hand far above all principalities and powers. In that nature hath God given to him to be head over all things to his church; and in that nature will he come again to judge the world in righteouſneſs. — But we forget all this time that his ſufferings were perfectly known to him, and yet were voluntary: he took them on himſelf when he could have avoided them. Mat. xxvi. 53, John xviii. 6. And this alone is a vindication of the divine juſtice in permitting Jeſus to ſuffer.

Permitting did you ſay? How then was Jeſus truly puniſhed? Yes, *permit*, we muſt ſay—permit unjuſt ſufferings, whatever ſcholaſtic difficulties you may raiſe about it. And ſo ſays Peter, an apoſtle of Jeſus Chriſt, though no ſchool-man. He tells the Jews—that Chriſt was delivered by the determinate counſel and foreknowledge of God; yet for all he was ſo delivered, ſays, YE *have taken, and by* WICKED *hands have crucified and ſlain.* Had the Jews been commanded, or only authorized, to have crucified Jeſus for his imputed

puted guilt, where would have been their great wickedneſs *?

Two things yet remain to be conſidered, one of them rather a matter of fact than a matter of argument; that Chriſt did not ſuffer in a ſtate of guilt reſpecting the inward feelings of his own mind, nor reſpecting his father's diſpoſition towards him.

The hiſtory is undoubtedly the only evidence of ſuch points; but here ſcripture ſays nothing. How then is it proved? Why, *à priori*, by taking the transfer or charge of guilt for granted. "The "ſins of believers being charged on Chriſt, how "could he be truly puniſhed for them without a "painful ſenſation of their horrid evil?" H. 153. Here is a ſingular refinement. Though guilty, yet it muſt not be ſaid Chriſt was conſcious of every ſin of every believer. No! but he had a *painful ſenſation* of their horrid evil. There is a painful ſenſation that always accompanies guilt, called *remorſe*; was it this? No. Was it an abhorrence of the evil of ſin, or pity for ſinners? Both

* In page 154, Lond. edit. it is ſaid,—"No created arm "being ſtrong enough to give the blow, *it pleaſed the Lord to* "*bruiſe him.*" We have the following curious note in the Edinb. edit. p. 124. "Iſai. liii. 10. The prophet ſays not, "It pleaſed the Lord that wicked men ſhould bruiſe him;— "but *it pleaſed the Lord himſelf to bruiſe him.*"—The word *himſelf*, inſerted as part of the text, is NOT in Iſaiah; nor is the notion countenanced by the Apoſtles. Acts ii. 23.

theſe

theſe every good man feels without an imputation of the ſins he abhors or pities. Again, there was a deluge of iniquities in Chriſt; ſurely then there muſt be ſome defilement. No. See Hervey, page 133.

In regard to the wrath of God upon Jeſus, this is ſtrongly inſiſted on. It is proved, *à priori*, in page 153, thus.—It was *unavoidable* with reſpect to the divine holineſs—it was *neceſſary* for our redemption. We have before obſerved upon this talk of *neceſſity*—the argument goes round in a circle. It was neceſſary for the procurement of our redemption (conſiſtently with juſtice) that Chriſt ſhould be guilty, truly puniſhed, and under the wrath of God; therefore he was guilty, truly puniſhed, &c. Again. We are told Chriſt was guilty, truly puniſhed, &c. therefore we are redeemed conſiſtently with juſtice.

As to the argument *à poſteriori* from the greatneſs of his ſufferings—that nothing but the wrath of God could occaſion ſo much terror, and ſuch complaints, &c. all this is mere aſſumption.

The agony on the proſpect of his approaching ſufferings, was exceeding great. "*My ſoul is exceeding ſorrowful even unto death.*" The nature of this ſorrow is no where explained either by the Apoſtles or Evangeliſts. He perfectly underſtood what he was to ſuffer, and might probably be more affected than a criminal who is ignorant. The torture of that puniſhment is by all accounts

moſt

moſt exquiſite: his bodily conſtitution ſeems to have been delicate and tender; even ſobriety and temperance might quicken the dreadful ſenſations; for he refuſed the intoxicating draught. Mark xv. 23. It is certain the torture was ſo ſevere to him that he died in conſequence of it much ſooner than uſual, or than thoſe who were crucified with him *. Mark xv. 44.

The proſpect of death might alſo be ſhocking to him who was the prince of life. For, notwithſtanding his human nature, he conſtantly knew who and what he was; proofs of this abound in his hiſtory.—We hardly know what it was to ſuch a one to "taſte of death."

That he ſuffered in mind as well as body, cannot be doubted from his agony in the garden. Yet, even then, when, as Hervey ſays, "God "was *now* become inexorable," he was ſo much the object of his father's love, (not wrath) that an angel was ſent to comfort him.

But he cried out—*My God, my God, why haſt thou forſaken me!*

The words are prophetic—and might be ſpoken in accompliſhment of the prophecy, as well as

* See a particular account of the nature of crucifixion in the gentleman's magazine for April, 1738, which is ſhocking even to read.—It loſt none of its horrors, when executed by the unfeeling ſoldiers of that brutiſh nation, the Romans. The puniſhment of robbers on the Volga ſomewhat reſembles it. See Hanway's travels.

when he ſaid, "I thirſt", though the words in neither caſe were ſpoken without real occaſion. However that be, it is certain the protection of God was ſo far withdrawn, that he was given up to the rage of cruel men, and poſſibly to the malice of evil ſpirits. (Luke xxii. 53. John xiv. 30.) He had before ſuſtained the aſſaults of the Devil in the ſoft and covert way of ſeduction; he was now to abide his open violence, the terrors of the powers of darkneſs, the unknown buffetings of Satan. Under ſuch ſufferings he might well ſay—thou haſt protected me formerly, why art thou ſo far from helping me now? Why hideſt thou thy face; why withdraweſt thou thy preſence from me?—But ſays not,—why is thy wrath ſo hot againſt me?

Nothing is ſaid in the hiſtory, four times circumſtantially related, of the wrath of God; nor is it mentioned, nor is it alluded to in the moſt diſtant manner, by the Apoſtles. Peter ſays—he bare our ſins in his own BODY on the tree—but nothing more *.

* If the wrath of God was removed from ſinners by the ſufferings of Chriſt, then, *whatever the nature of thoſe ſufferings were*, Chriſt may be ſaid (by a common figure of ſpeech) to have born *that wrath*. To have trodden the wine-preſs of the wrath of God againſt ſinners. Nothing in theſe figurative expreſſions in the prophets can warrant a transfer of the wrath of God againſt the perſon of ſinners, to the perſon of Chriſt; unleſs authorized by the Apoſtles.

If

If the ſufferings of Chriſt on the croſs were in themſelves a mark of God's wrath, why not his other ſufferings in the human nature? Mat. viii. 20. Yet in the midſt of theſe he was twice declared by a voice from the Father to be his beloved ſon in whom he is well pleaſed.—As to what is ſaid about the *dignity* of the conduct of Chriſt in the garden, page 153, 154, &c.—it is mere declamation.

The other thing that remains to be conſidered is the equality or equipollency of the ſufferings of Chriſt in point of penal ſatisfaction, as it is called in H: 156.

Were the ſufferings of Chriſt as man's ſubſtitute, and in the ſtead of ſinners, exactly what ſinners would otherwiſe have ſuffered; the *penal* ſatisfaction would have been complete. And this is ſometimes affirmed. So p. 51, "The puniſh-"ment which we deſerved he endures. P. 122, "The juſt God made *that* vengeance to fall upon "him which muſt otherwiſe have been executed "upon us. P. 127, Our Lords death was *truly* "vicarious—he ſuffered what was *our* due and "*our* doom. P. 130, Chriſt has delivered us from "the curſe of the law. How? By taking our "place and enduring *what* we deſerved. Chriſt "ſuffered the VERY ſentence which the law de-"nounced on us. He endured that VERY curſe "which we deſerved. P. 135, He endured the

"punishment *due*—in the plain and FULL sense of "the word due to our sins."

No doubt, as Hervey says, p. 130, either this must be suffering in OUR STEAD, or nothing else can *.

But this is too gross to be maintained. Therefore we are told in p. 132. "He suffered the "punishment which we, *or an equivalent to that* "*which we* should have suffered." And in p. 156, "In the estimate of divine justice, and in point "of penal satisfaction, the sufferings of Christ "were equivalent to our endless punishment."

If we call that an equivalent, in consideration of which God has declared *there is now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus*; if we judge of the value of this equivalent from its ef-

* It was the opinion of many of our reformers that Christ descended into hell, and suffered there the punishment due, *in the plain and full sense of the word due*, to our sins.

"But now I will say a worde.—There be some great "clarkes that take my part.—Our Saviour Christ not only "in soul descended into hell, but also suffered in hell such "paynes as the damned spirits did suffer there. I believe "verily for my parte that he suffered the pains of hell pro-"portionally, as it correspondeth and answereth to the "whole sinne of the worlde."

Latymer's seventh sermon before King Edward, printed by *Day*. Lond. 1562.

Unless the SURETY pays the whole debt (of eternal punishment) the debtor is still liable to the unpaid part of it. —To argue just as Hervey does, p. 200, &c.

fects

fects declared in the ſcripture, there can be no doubt about the matter; and had this been ſaid at firſt, the whole four dialogues might have been ſpared.

But if we are not content to believe that divine juſtice is ſatisfied merely on authority, we muſt then proceed in Hervey's way to calculate the value of this equivalent from the ſeverity of the ſufferings, and the dignity of the ſufferer*; to ſee whether on the whole ſuch ſufferings are really equivalent to the endleſs puniſhment of all the believing ſinners of all ages and of all places.

In this calculation, eſtimation, or what you will, the firſt part, p. 156, is wholly rhetorical; in the other part, p. 157, we hear of the proportion of ſufferings to demerit.—"Finite creatures "cannot make an infinite ſatisfaction, our Lord "being truly and properly infinite, he finiſhed "his work at once.—His ſufferings are adequate, "nay on account of his infinite nature, they are "more than adequate to an eternity of puniſh-"ment†!"

* Is not this notion, of eſtimating *penal ſatisfaction* by the *dignity* of the ſufferer, wholly borrowed from human weakneſs? Earthly princes are AFFRONTED by thoſe who oppoſe them and require SATISFACTION. This they eſtimate by the DIGNITY of him who ſubmits to the penalty they impoſe.—All this is as foreign from diſtributive juſtice, as it is from ſcripture-repreſentation.—We ſpeak not here of the merit of Chriſt in ſubmitting to the will of the Father.

† What of impenitent, as well as penitent ſinners?

No reply ought, or indeed can be made to ſuch metaphyſics!

It will be aſked, if you will not hear of *penal* ſatisfaction, what are we to ſay *?—Suppoſe we ſhould ſay with *Theron*, in Hervey's Dialogues, "The obedience and death of Chriſt were conducive to (*procured* ſurely) our redemption, *only* "in virtue of his Father's will and appointment." —Why this is rejected with abhorrence by *Aſpaſio*, p. 91, as injurious to the dignity and merit of Chriſt. The ſame objection is ſtated more clearly by *Robert Hall*, thus:—"That Chriſt became a ſacrifice in conſequence of divine appointment is evident; but that its worth, efficacy, and merit, aroſe from thence, can never be proved." — *Help to Zion's Travellers*, page 98.

When we do not ſee the reaſons of any divine appointments, we reſolve them into the good pleaſure of God; yet ſurely we mean not to ſay his appointments are arbitrary or without reaſon; or that his counſels are not founded in conſummate wiſdom reſpecting his attributes and his government. We mean no more when we ſpeak thus, than that we ought to acquieſce; though we at preſent ſee not thoſe reaſons, nor are admitted into the ſecrets of his councils.

* Butler's anſwer to this queſtion may be ſeen in P. ii. Ch. v. page 296, Analogy. Edit. 8vo. 1736.

Children

Children are ſent to ſchool and taught to read, for which they know no other reaſon than that it is the will of their parents; and in this they ſhould acquieſce, for no other can they underſtand.——And ſhall they object and ſay—the command of our parents can never make reading uſeful?—No, to be ſure; but becauſe (in reſpect of the human condition) reading is uſeful, therefore they are taught to read.—And they may be taught alſo to believe that the commands of their parents are founded in wiſdom and love, whether they, AT PRESENT, ſee it or no.

We have now gone through the whole that is alledged for this ſcheme of *vicarious* ſatisfaction, both from reaſon and ſcripture;—if *that* can be called reaſon which is only poſitive aſſertions, rhetorical flouriſhes, or metaphyſical jargon;—or *that* ſcripture, where ſo many and ſuch plain texts are miſapplied.—It is not eaſy to reply to the fanciful diſtinctions of inherent and imputed guilt, charge of guilt, &c. ſuch phantoms will always elude your ſtroke,

——— *fruſtra ferro diverberet umbras.*

But then you may conjure up, as many more as you pleaſe; we may reckon another ſort of guilt, *aſſumed guilt*; not naturally inherent, not conveyed by the imputation of another, not forced on us by a charge, but that which a man takes upon himſelf—or we may ſplit imputed guilt into vo-

luntary and involuntary, &c. and so on for ever.

Men may glean up scraps of scripture to suit any purpose; — compare the *tenor* of what is said by these writers, with the *tenor* of what the Apostles say. We find nothing in their writings about Christ's being justly or truly punished; about imputation of sin, or a charge of guilt; about standing in our law-place as a substitute, or obligation to punishment; about commutation of persons and penal satisfaction; yet all this is dignified by some with the title of EVANGELICAL PRINCIPLES! See Hervey, p. 168.—*I testify unto every man that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book, if any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book.* Rev. xxii. 18.

APPENDIX.

SOME may ask, what does the church of England say to these doctrines?—All that relates to the righteousness of Christ imputed to man is in the 11th article "of justification," which says,—"we are *accounted* righteous before God, "only for the merit of Christ," &c.—but nothing about a transfer of righteousness; nor is imputed righteousness there spoken of as a personal quality in believers.

As

As to the other part of this doctrine, the sin of man imputed to Christ; if any where, we might expect it in the 15th article, "of Christ alone "without sin." The perfect innocence of Christ in every respect is clearly and positively asserted —nothing said of imputed sin, and no distinction of guilt. As the imputation of the sin of man to Christ is confessedly the ground of this doctrine of penal satisfaction, (Hervey, page 47) and is not here mentioned; we must at least say that the church keeps a profound silence on this doctrine.

The word satisfaction is used by the church once in the communion service, once in the articles, and once or twice in the homilies*.

In the communion service we read—"Who "made by the one oblation of himself once of-"fered a full, perfect, and sufficient oblation "and *satisfaction* for the sins of the whole world." And in the 31st article—"The offering once made "is that perfect redemption, propitiation, and *sa-"tisfaction* for all the sins of the whole world."

* One of the church prayers also concludes, "through the *satisfaction* of thy son." Satisfaction is here synonymous with atonement, propitiation, &c.—In this sense it is used by Butler, page 306. Also by Doddridge, Lectures, p. 418. Words descriptive of the effects of Christ's sufferings—not of the way in which they had their efficacy.—Not so *penal* satisfaction.

Several words of nearly the ſame import are here put together to ſtrengthen the aſſertion that Chriſt was offered *once* only; and that this once was a ſufficient ſacrifice, oblation, ſatisfaction, redemption, or whatever elſe you pleaſe to term it, for the ſins of the whole world; plainly in oppoſition to the Popiſh doctrine of the ſacrifice of Chriſt repeated in every maſs.

The homily of juſtification (or ſalvation) ſays, "Three things muſt go together in our juſtification. On Chriſt's part, juſtice; that is the ſatisfaction of God's juſtice or price of our redemption, by the offering of his body, and ſhedding of his blood with fulfilling the law."

In the homily of the paſſion. "Our debt was a great deal too great for us to have paid; and without payment, God the father could never be at one with us: neither was it poſſible to be looſed from this debt by our own ability. It pleaſed him therefore to be the payer thereof, and to diſcharge us quite."

Such illuſtrations we may expect and muſt admit in popular ſermons. The drift of all this is to affirm man's inability to redeem himſelf; that without an atonement God could not receive ſinners into his favour, that Chriſt made this atonement by the ſacrifice of himſelf.

They who ſubſcribe the article "that the Book of Homilies doth contain a godly and wholeſome doctrine,"

"doctrine," do not ſubſcribe to the propriety of every metaphor, the force of every argument, no, nor the truth of every aſſertion to be found in a large volume of popular ſermons. This very homily ſays,—"Our great grandfather Adam broke "God's commandment in eating the *Apple* for-"bidden him."—Do we therefore ſubſcribe to this —that the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was an apple-tree?

All that we find in the homilies, relating to ſatisfaction, amounts to no more than ſaying in general terms, that the juſtice of God was ſatisfied, and believers redeemed from puniſhment by the ſacrifice of Chriſt. It is not the general doctrine, but a particular explanation of it, to which we have all along objected. This explanation, we apprehend, is unſcriptural; founded on metaphyſical notions of ſchoolmen, and inadequate to its purpoſe. It has been the misfortune of Chriſtianity in all ages, that the philoſophy of the times has forced its way into the church; that very philoſophy againſt which we are ſo much cautioned by Paul. While men argue from ſcripture and the analogy of God's government, they go upon ſure grounds; God's word, and matter of fact: and from theſe, the doctrine of atonement has been clearly laid down, and ably defended from objections; and there we ſhould reſt. To anſwer objections and explain difficulties,

ties, are very different things. To explain a difficulty we muſt ſhow its connexion with ſome known truth; and many truths we muſt admit, whoſe connexion with that ſlender ſtock of truth we now poſſeſs, is not diſcernable. The connexion between the moon's motion and the falling of a ſtone to the earth, philoſophers have diſcovered; and ſo have EXPLAINED the moon's motion, with much ſelf-complacency. But they have not ſhown the connexion between theſe motions and thoſe we call electrical or magnetical, though Newton was fully perſuaded there was ſuch a one.

It is but juſtice to ſay that the doctrine we have oppoſed is not peculiarly Hervey's own. No! he honeſtly, and without diſguiſe, repreſents the doctrine of others. Nor would we depreciate the labours or the character of a pious and learned man, and a moſt uſeful preacher of the goſpel. It is only to be regretted that he engaged in ſuch ſubjects rather than in thoſe in which he could diſplay a luxuriant imagination. In this reſpect his other works are much admired, and very uſeful to *the many*, by giving them a ſerious and religious turn of mind. And to ſuch his book of Dialogues may be uſeful. Such perſons may profit by the piety it contains, and will never ſee its abſurdities. The caſe is otherwiſe ſhould it fall into the hands of men of ſenſe; and thoſe not well

well diſpoſed to revealed religion. It muſt needs diſguſt them, and make them averſe to the bible, when thoſe who are ſuppoſed to read it moſt, and underſtand it beſt, give ſuch an account of the doctrines it contains. But, in fact, theſe explanations of the myſtery of redemption are not the bible, but the *hay* and *ſtubble* which indiſcreet piety has built upon that foundation. The great myſtery of Godlineſs refuſes to be ſcrutinized by our ſhallow underſtanding; human explanations only diſgrace and defile it.

Thou ſhalt build the altar of the Lord thy God of whole ſtones; thou ſhalt not build it of hewn ſtone; for if thou lift up thy tool upon it, THOU HAST POLLUTED IT.

THE END.

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